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Abstract
Monte Carlo Tree Search (MCTS) has recently been successfully used to create strategies
for playing imperfect-information games. Despite its popularity, there are no theoretic re-
sults that guarantee its convergence to a well-defined solution, such as Nash equilibrium,
in these games. We partially fill this gap by analysing MCTS in the class of zero-sum
extensive-form games with simultaneous moves but otherwise perfect information. The
lack of information about the opponent’s concurrent moves already causes that optimal
strategies may require randomization. We present theoretic as well as empirical investi-
gation of the speed and quality of convergence of these algorithms to the Nash equilibria.
Primarily, we show that after minor technical modifications, MCTS based on any (ap-
proximately) Hannan consistent selection function always converges to an (approximate)
subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. Without these modifications, Hannan consistency is
not sufficient to ensure such convergence and the selection function must satisfy additional
properties, which empirically hold for the most common Hannan consistent algorithms.
Keywords: Nash Equilibrium, Extensive Form Games, Simultaneous Moves, Zero Sum,
Hannan Consistency
1. Introduction
Monte Carlo tree search (MCTS) is a very popular algorithm which recently caused a
significant jump in performance of the state-of-the-art solvers for many perfect information
problems, such as the game of Go (Gelly and Silver, 2011), or domain-independent planning
under uncertainty (Keller and Eyerich, 2012). The main idea of Monte Carlo tree search
is running a large number of randomized simulations of the problem and learning the best
actions to choose based on this data. It generally uses the earlier simulations to create
statistics that help guiding the latter simulations to more important parts of the search
space. After the success in domains with perfect information, the following research applied
the principles of MCTS also to games with imperfect information, such as an imperfect
information variant of Chess (Ciancarini and Favini, 2010), or imperfect information board
games (Powley et al., 2014; Nijssen and Winands, 2012). The same type of algorithms
can also be applied to real-world domains, such as robotics (Lisy´ et al., 2012a) or network
security (Lisy´ et al., 2012b).
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While all these applications show that MCTS is a promising technique also for playing
imperfect information games, very little research has been devoted to understanding the
fundamental principles behind the success of these methods in practice. In this paper,
we aim to partially fill this gap. We focus on the simplest class of imperfect information
games, which are games with simultaneous moves, but otherwise perfect information. MCTS
algorithms has been successfully applied to many games form this class, including card
games (Teytaud and Flory, 2011; Lanctot et al., 2014), variants of simple computer games
(Perick et al., 2012), or in the most successful agents for General Game Playing (Finnsson
and Bjo¨rnsson, 2008). This class of games is simpler than the generic imperfect information
games, but it already includes one of the most fundamental complication caused by the
imperfect information, which is the need for randomized (mixed) strategies. This can be
demonstrated on the well-known game of Rock-Paper-Scissors. Any deterministic strategy
for playing the game can be easily exploited by the opponent and the optimal strategy is
to randomize uniformly over all actions.
Game theory provides fundamental concepts and results that describe the optimal be-
haviour in games. In zero-sum simultaneous-move games, the optimal strategy is a subgame
perfect Nash equilibrium. For each possible situation in the game, it prescribes a strategy,
which is optimal in several aspects. It is a strategy that gains the highest expected reward
against its worst opponent, even if the opponent knows the strategy played by the player in
advance. Moreover, in the zero-sum setting, even if the opponent does not play rationally,
the strategy still guarantees at least the reward it would gain against a rational opponent.
While computing a Nash equilibrium in a zero-sum game is a polynomially solvable
problem (Koller and Megiddo, 1992), the games where MCTS is commonly applied are too
large to allow even representing the Nash equilibrium strategy explicitly, which is generally
required by exact algorithms for computing NE. Therefore, we cannot hope that MCTS
will compute the equilibrium strategy for the complete game in the given time and space,
but we still argue that eventual convergence to the Nash equilibrium, or some other well
understood game theoretic concept, is a desirable property of MCTS algorithms in this
class of games: first, an algorithm which converges to NE is more suitable in the anytime
setting, where MCTS algorithms are most commonly used. The more time it has available
for the computation, the closer it will be to the optimal solution. This does not always
hold for MCTS algorithms in this class of games, which can stabilize in a fixed distance
from an equilibrium (Shafiei et al., 2009; Ponsen et al., 2011) or even start diverging at
some point (Lanctot et al., 2014). Second, if the game is close to its end, it may already
be small enough for an algorithm with guaranteed convergence to converge to almost exact
NE and play optimally. Non-convergent MCTS algorithms can exhibit various pathologies
in these situations. Third, understanding the fundamental game theoretic properties of the
strategies the algorithm converge to can lead to developing better variants of MCTS for
this class of games.
1.1 Contributions
We focus on two-player zero-sum extensive form games with simultaneous moves but other-
wise perfect information. We denote the standard MCTS algorithm applied in this setting
as SM-MCTS. We present a modified SM-MCTS algorithm (SM-MCTS-A), which updates
2
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the selection functions by averages of the sampled values, rather than the current values
themselves. We show that SM-MCTS-A combined with any (approximate) Hannan con-
sistent (HC) selection function with guaranteed exploration converges to (approximate)
subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium in this class of games. We present bounds on the rela-
tion of the convergence rate and the eventual distance from the Nash equilibrium on the
main parameters of the games and the selection functions. We then highlight the fact that
without the “-A” modification, Hannan consistency of the selection function is not suffi-
cient for a similar result. We present a Hannan consistent selection function that causes the
standard SM-MCTS algorithm to converge to a solution far from the equilibrium. However,
additional requirements on the selection function used in SM-MCTS can guarantee the con-
vergence. As an example, we define the property of having unbiased payoff observations
(UPO), and show that it is a sufficient condition for convergence of SM-MCTS. We then
empirically confirm that the two commonly used Hannan consistent algorithms, Exp3 and
regret matching, satisfy this property, thus justifying their use in practice. We further show
that the empirical speed of convergence as well as the eventual distance from the equilibrium
is typically much better than the guarantees given by the presented theory. We empirically
show that SM-MCTS generally converges to the same equilibrium as SM-MCTS-A, but
does it slightly faster.
We also give theoretical grounds for some practical improvements, which are often used
with SM-MCTS, but have not been formally justified. These include removal of exploration
samples from the resulting strategy and the use of average strategy instead of empirical
frequencies of action choices. All presented theoretic results trivially apply also to perfect
information games with sequential moves.
1.2 Article outline
In Section 2 we describe simultaneous-move games, the standard SM-MCTS algorithm and
its modification SM-MCTS-A. We follow with the multi-armed bandit problem and show
how it applies in our setting. Lastly we recall the definition of Hannan consistency and
explain Exp3 and regret matching, two of the common Hannan consistent bandit algorithms.
In Section 3, we present the main theoretical results. First, we consider the modified SM-
MCTS-A algorithm and present the asymptotic and finite time bounds on its convergence
rate. We follow by defining the unbiased payoff observations property and proving the
convergence of SM-MCTS based on HC selection functions with this property. In Section 5
we provide a counterexample showing that for general Hannan consistent algorithms, SM-
MCTS does not necessarily converge and thus the result about SM-MCTS-A from Section
3 is optimal in the sense that it does not hold for SM-MCTS. We then present an example
which gives a lower bound on the quality of a strategy to which SM-MCTS(-A) converges.
In Section 4, we discuss the notion of exploitability, which measures the quality of a strategy,
and we make a few remarks about which strategy should be considered as the output of SM-
MCTS(-A). In Section 6, we present empirical investigation of convergence of SM-MCTS
and SM-MCTS-A, as well as empirical confirmation of the fact that the the commonly used
HC-algorithms guarantee the UPO property. Finally, Section 7 summarizes the results and
highlights open questions, which might be interesting for future research.
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2. Background
We now introduce the game theory fundamentals and notation used throughout the paper.
We define simultaneous move games, describe the SM-MCTS algorithm and its modification
SM-MCTS-A, and afterwards, we discuss existing selection functions and their properties.
2.1 Simultaneous move games
A finite two-player zero-sum game with perfect information and simultaneous moves can be
described by a tuple (N ,H, C,Z,A, T ,∆c, ui, h0), where N = {1, 2} contains player labels,
H is a set of inner states, C is the set of chance states and Z denotes the terminal states.
A = A1×A2 is the set of joint actions of individual players and we denoteA1(h) = {1 . . .mh}
and A2(h) = {1 . . . nh} the actions available to individual players in state h ∈ H. The game
begins in an initial state h0. The transition function T : H×A1×A2 7→ H∪C∪Z defines the
successor state given a current state and actions for both players. For brevity, we sometimes
denote T (h, i, j) ≡ hij . The chance strategy ∆c : C 7→ H× [0, 1] determines the next states
in chance nodes based on a fixed commonly known probability distribution. The utility
function u1 : Z 7→ [umin, umax] ⊆ R gives the utility of player 1, with umin and umax denoting
the minimum and maximum possible utility respectively. Without loss of generality we
assume umin = 0 and umax = 1. We assume zero-sum games: ∀z ∈ Z, u2(z) = −u1(z).
A matrix game is a single-stage simultaneous move game with action sets A1 and A2.
Each entry in the matrix M = (aij) where (i, j) ∈ A1 × A2 and aij ∈ [0, 1] corresponds
to a payoff (to player 1) if row i is chosen by player 1 and column j by player 2. A
strategy σi ∈ ∆(Ai) is a distribution over the actions in Ai. If σ1 is represented as a row
vector and σ2 as a column vector, then the expected value to player 1 when both players
play with these strategies is u1(σ1, σ2) = σ1Mσ2. Given a profile σ = (σ1, σ2), define
the utilities against best response strategies to be u1(br, σ2) = maxσ′1∈∆(A1) σ
′
1Mσ2 and
u1(σ1, br) = minσ′2∈∆(A2) σ1Mσ
′
2. A strategy profile (σ1, σ2) is an -Nash equilibrium of the
matrix game M if and only if
u1(br, σ2)− u1(σ1, σ2) ≤  and u1(σ1, σ2)− u1(σ1, br) ≤  (1)
Two-player perfect information games with simultaneous moves are sometimes appropri-
ately called stacked matrix games because at every state h there is a joint action set
A1(h) × A2(h) that either leads to a terminal state or to a subgame which is itself an-
other stacked matrix game with a unique value, which can be determined by backward
induction (see Figure 1).
A behavioral strategy for player i is a mapping from states h ∈ H to a probability
distribution over the actions Ai(h), denoted σi(h). Given a profile σ = (σ1, σ2), define the
probability of reaching a terminal state z under σ as piσ(z) = piσ1 (z)pi
σ
2 (z)pic(z), where each
piσi (z) (resp. pic(z)) is a product of probabilities of the actions taken by player i (the chance)
along the path to z. Define Σi to be the set of behavioral strategies for player i. Then for
any strategy profile σ = (σ1, σ2) ∈ Σ1 × Σ2 we define the expected utility of the strategy
profile (for player 1) as
u(σ) = u(σ1, σ2) =
∑
z∈Z
piσ(z)u1(z) (2)
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Figure 1: Example game tree of a game with perfect information and simultaneous moves.
Only the leaves contain actual rewards - the values in the inner nodes are achieved by
optimal play in the corresponding subtree, they are not part of the definition of the game.
An -Nash equilibrium profile (σ1, σ2) in this case is defined analogously to (1). In other
words, none of the players can improve their utility by more than  by deviating unilaterally.
If σ = (σ1, σ2) is an exact Nash equilibrium (-NE with  = 0), then we denote the unique
value of the game vh0 = u(σ1, σ2). For any h ∈ H, we denote vh the value of the subgame
rooted in state h.
2.2 Simultaneous move Monte Carlo Tree Search
Monte Carlo Tree Search (MCTS) is a simulation-based state space search algorithm often
used in game trees. The main idea is to iteratively run simulations to a terminal state,
incrementally growing a tree rooted at the current state. In the basic form of the algorithm,
the tree is initially empty and a single leaf is added each iteration. The nodes in the tree
represent game states. Each simulation starts by visiting nodes in the tree, selecting which
actions to take based on the information maintained in the node, and then consequently
transitioning to the successor node. When a node whose immediate children are not all in
the tree is visited, we expand this node by adding a new leaf to the tree. Then we apply a
rollout policy (for example, random action selection) from the new leaf to a terminal state
of the game. The outcome of the simulation is then returned as a reward to the new leaf
and all its predecessors.
In Simultaneous Move MCTS (SM-MCTS), the main difference is that a joint action
of both players is selected and used to transition to a following state. The algorithm has
been previously applied, for example in the game of Tron (Perick et al., 2012), Urban
Rivals (Teytaud and Flory, 2011), and in general game-playing (Finnsson and Bjo¨rnsson,
2008). However, guarantees of convergence to NE remain unknown, and Shafiei et al.
(2009) show that the most popular selection policy (UCB) does not converge, even in a
simple one-stage game. The convergence to a NE depends critically on the selection and
update policies applied, which are even more non-trivial in simultaneous-move games than
in purely sequential games. We describe variants of two popular selection algorithms in
Section 2.3.
In Figure 2, we present a generic template of MCTS algorithms for simultaneous-move
games (SM-MCTS). We then proceed to explain how specific algorithms are derived from
this template. Figure 2 describes a single iteration of SM-MCTS. T represents the incre-
mentally built MCTS tree, in which each state is represented by one node. Every node h
maintains algorithm-specific statistics about the iterations that previously used this node.
5
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SM-MCTS(h – current state of the game)
1: if h ∈ Z then return u1(h)
2: if h ∈ C then
3: Sample h′ ∼ ∆c(h)
4: return SM-MCTS(h′)
5: if h ∈ T then
6: (a1, a2)← Select(h)
7: h′ ← T (h, a1, a2)
8: x← SM-MCTS(h′)
9: Update(h, a1, a2, x)
10: return x
11: else
12: T ← T ∪ {h}
13: x← Rollout(h)
14: return x
Figure 2: Simultaneous Move Monte Carlo Tree Search
The template can be instantiated by specific implementations of the updates of the statistics
on line 9 and the selection based on these statistics on line 6. In the terminal states, the
algorithm returns the value of the state for the first player (line 1). In the chance nodes,
the algorithm selects one of the possible next states based on the chance distribution (line
3) and recursively calls the algorithm on this state (line 4). If the current state has a node
in the current MCTS tree T , the statistics in the node are used to select an action for each
player (line 6). These actions are executed (line 7) and the algorithm is called recursively on
the resulting state (line 8). The result of this call is used to update the statistics maintained
for state h (line 9). If the current state is not stored in tree T , it is added to the tree (line
12) and its value is estimated using the rollout policy (line 13). The rollout policy is usually
uniform random action selection until the game reaches a terminal state, but it can also be
based on domain-specific knowledge. Finally, the result of the Rollout is returned to higher
levels of the tree.
This template can be instantiated by choosing a specific selection and update functions.
Different algorithms can be the bases for selection functions, but the most successful selec-
tion functions are based on the algorithms for multi-armed bandit problem we introduce
in Section 2.3. The action for each player in each node is selected independently, based on
these algorithms and the updates update the statistics for player one by u1 and for player
two by u2 = −u1 as if they were independent multi-armed bandit problems.
SM-MCTS algorithm does not always converge to Nash equilibrium - to guarantee con-
vergence, additional assumptions on the selection functions are required. Therefore, we also
propose a variant of the algorithm, which we denote as SM-MCTS-A. Later we show that
this variant converges to NE under more reasonable assumptions on the selection function.
The difference is that for each node h ∈ T , the algorithm also stores the number nh of
iterations that visit this node and the cumulative reward Xh received from the recursive
call in these iterations. Every time node h is visited, it increases nh by one and adds x to
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Xh. SM-MCTS-A then differs from SM-MCTS only on line 9, where the selection functions
at h are updated by Xh
′
/nh
′
instead of x.
We note that in our previous work (Lisy´ et al., 2013) we prove a result similar to our
Theorem 8 here. However, the algorithm that we used earlier is different from SM-MCTS-
A algorithm described here. In particular, SM-MCTS-A uses averaged values for decision
making in each node, but propagates backwards the non-averaged values (unlike the previous
version, which also updates the selection function based on the averaged values, but then
it propagates backwards these averaged numbers - and on the next level, it takes averages
of averages and so on). Consequently, this new version is much closer to the non-averaged
SM-MCTS algorithm used in practice and it has faster empirical convergence.
2.3 Multi-armed bandit problem
Multi-armed bandit (MAB) problem is one of the most basic models in online learning. In
theoretic studies, it is often the basic model for studying fundamental trade-offs between
exploration and exploitation in an unknown environment (Auer et al., 1995, 2002). In prac-
tical applications, the algorithms developed for this model has recently been used in online
advertising (Pandey et al., 2007), generic optimization (Flaxman et al., 2005), and most
importantly for this paper in Monte Carlo tree search algorithms (Kocsis and Szepesva´ri,
2006; Browne et al., 2012; Gelly and Silver, 2011; Teytaud and Flory, 2011).
The multi-armed bandit problem got its name after a simple motivating example con-
cerning slot machines in casinos, also known as one-armed bandits. Assume you have a fixed
number of coins n you want to use in a casino with K slot machines. Each slot machine has
a hole where you can insert a coin and as a result, the machine will give you some (often
zero) reward. Each of the slot machines is generally different and decides on the size of
the rewards using a different mechanism. The basic task is to use the n coins sequentially,
one by one, to receive the largest possible cumulative reward. Intuitively, it is necessary
to sufficiently explore the quality of the machines, but not to use too many coins in the
machines that are not likely to be good. The following formal definitions use the notation
from an extensive survey of the field by Bubeck and Cesa-Bianchi (2012).
Definition 1 (Adversarial multi-armed bandit problem) Multi-armed bandit problem
is a set of actions (or arms) denoted 1, . . . ,K, and a set of sequences xi(T ) for each action
i and time step T = 1, 2, . . . . In each time step, an agent selects an action i(T ) and receives
the payoff xi(T )(T ). In general, the agent does not learn the values xi(T ) for i 6= i(T ).
The adversarial MAB problem is a MAB problem, in which in each time step an ad-
versary selects arbitrary rewards xi(T ) ∈ [0, 1] simultaneously with the agent selecting the
action.
The algorithms for solving the MAB problem usually optimize some notion of regret.
Intuitively, the algorithms try to minimize the difference between playing the strategy given
by the algorithm and playing some baseline strategy, which can possibly use information
not available to the agent. For example, the most common notion of regret is the external
regret, which is the difference between playing according to the prescribed strategy and
playing the fixed optimal action all the time.
7
Kovarˇ´ık and Lisy´
Definition 2 (External Regret) The external regret for playing a sequence of actions
i(1), . . . , i(n) is defined as
R(t) = max
i=1,...,K
t∑
s=1
xi(s)−
t∑
s=1
xi(s)(s).
By r(t) we denote the average external regret r(T ) := 1tR(t).
2.3.1 Application to SM-MCTS(-A)
We now explain how MAB problem applies in the setting of SM-MCTS(-A). We focus on
the situation for player 1. For a fixed node h ∈ H, our goal is to define the MAB reward
assignment xi(t) for i ∈ Ai(h), t ∈ N, as they are perceived by the selection function
Firstly we introduce two auxiliary symbols uh(T ) and T h(t): Let T be an iteration
during which the node h got visited. By uh(T ) we denote the value (from line 9 of the
algorithm on Figure 2) by which the selection function was updated during iteration T
(this value is either x for SM-MCTS, or Xh
′
/nh
′
for SM-MCTS-A). We also set T h(t) to be
the iteration during which node h was visited for the t-th time.
By i(t) ∈ A1(h) and j(t) ∈ A2(h) we denote the actions, which were selected in h during
iteration T h(t). We can now define the desired MAB reward assignment. By the definition
of SM-MCTS(-A) algorithm (line 9), the reward xi(t)(t) has to be equal to the t-th observed
value uh
(
T h(t)
)
, thus it remains to define the rewards xi(t) for i 6= i(t). Intuitively, the
rewards for these actions should be “the values we would have seen if we chose differently”.
Formally we set
xi(t) := u
h
(
T h(t˜)
)
, where T h(t˜) is the earliest iteration during
which h got visited, such that t˜ ≥ t, i(t˜) = i and j(t˜) = j(t).
We can see that for i = i(t), we have t˜ = t and therefore the definition coincides with the
one we promised earlier.
Technical remark : Strictly speaking, it is not immediately obvious that (xi(t)), as de-
fined above, is a MAB reward assignment - in MAB problem, the rewards xi(t), i ∈ Ai(h)
have to be defined before the t-th action is chosen. Luckily, this is not a problem in our
case - in theory we could compute SM-MCTS(h′) for all possible child nodes h′ in advance
(before line 6), and keep each of them until they are selected. The overall behavior of SM-
MCTS(-A) would remain the same (except that it would run much slower) and the rewards
(xi(t)) would correspond to a MAB problem.
In the remainder of this section, we introduce the technical notation used throughout
the paper. First, we define the notions of cumulative payoff G and maximum cumulative
payoff Gmax and relate these quantities to the external regret:
G(t) :=
t∑
s=1
xi(s)(s)
8
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Gmax(t) := max
i∈A1
t∑
s=1
xi(s)(s),
R(t) = Gmax(t)−G(t).
We also define the corresponding average notions and relate them to the average regret:
g(t) := G(t)/t, gmax(t) := Gmax(t)/t, r(t) = gmax(t)− g(t). If there is a risk of confusion as
to in which node we are interested, we will add a superscript h and denote these variables
as gh(t), ghmax(t) and so on.
Focusing now on the given node h, let i be an action of player 1 and j an action of player
2. We denote by ti, tj the number of times these actions were chosen up to the t-th visit of
h and tij the number of times both of these actions has been chosen at once. By empirical
frequencies we mean the strategy profile σˆh(t) =
(
σˆh1 (t), σˆ
h
2 (t)
)
given by the formulas
σˆh1 (t)(i) = ti/t, σˆ
h
2 (t)(j) = tj/t
By average strategies, we mean the strategy profile
(
σ¯h1 (t), σ¯
h
2 (t)
)
given by the formulas
σ¯h1 (t)(i) =
t∑
s=1
σh1 (s)(i)/t, σ¯
h
2 (t)(j) =
t∑
s=1
σh2 (s)(j)/t,
where σh1 (s), σ
h
2 (s) are the strategies used at h at time s.
Lastly, by σˆ(T ) we denote the collection
(
σˆh(th(T ))
)
h∈H of empirical frequencies at all
nodes h ∈ H, where th(T ) denotes, for the use of this definition, the number of visits of h
up to the T -th iteration of SM-MCTS(-A). Similarly we define the average strategy σ¯(T ).
The following lemma says there eventually is no difference between these two strategies.
Lemma 3 As t approaches infinity, the empirical frequencies and average strategies will
almost surely be equal. That is, lim supt→∞maxi∈A1 |σˆ1(t, i) − σ¯1(t, i)| = 0 holds with
probability 1.
The proof is a consequence of the Strong Law of Large Numbers (and it can be found
in the appendix).
2.4 Hannan consistent algorithms
A desirable goal for an algorithm in MAB setting is the classical notion of Hannan consis-
tency (HC). Having this property means that for high enough t, the algorithm performs
nearly as well as it would if it played the optimal constant action since the beginning.
Definition 4 (Hannan consistency) An algorithm is -Hannan consistent for some  ≥
0 if lim supt→∞ r(t) ≤  holds with probability 1, where the “probability” is understood with
respect to the randomization of the algorithm. Algorithm is Hannan consistent if it is 0-
Hannan consistent.
We now present regret matching and Exp3, two of the -Hannan consistent algorithms
previously used in MCTS context. The proofs of Hannan consistency of variants of these
two algorithms, as well as more related results, can be found in a survey by Cesa-Bianchi
and Lugosi (2006, Section 6). The fact that the variants presented here are -HC is not
explicitly stated there, but it immediately follows from the last inequality in the proof of
Theorem 6.6 in the survey.
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Input: K - number of actions; γ - exploration parameter
1: ∀iGi ← 0
2: for t← 1, 2, . . . do
3: ∀ipi ← exp(
γ
KGi)∑K
j=1 exp(
γ
KGj)
4: p′i ← (1− γ)pi + γK
5: Use action It from distribution p
′ and receive reward r
6: GIt ← GIt + rp′It
Figure 3: Exponential-weight algorithm for Exploration and Exploitation (Exp3) algorithm
for regret minimization in adversarial bandit setting
2.4.1 Exponential-weight algorithm for Exploration and Exploitation
The most popular algorithm for minimizing regret in adversarial bandit setting is the
Exponential-weight algorithm for Exploration and Exploitation (Exp3) proposed by Auer
et al. (2003) and further improved by Stoltz (2005). The algorithm has many different
variants for various modifications of the setting and desired properties. We present a for-
mulation of the algorithm based on the original version in Figure 3.
Exp3 stores the estimates of cumulative reward of each action over all iterations, even
those in which the action was not selected. In the pseudo-code in Figure 3, we denote
this value for action i by Gi. It is initially set to 0 on line 1. In each iteration, a prob-
ability distribution p is created proportionally to the exponential of these estimates. The
distribution is combined with a uniform distribution with probability γ to ensure sufficient
exploration of all actions (line 4). After an action is selected and the reward is received,
the estimate for the performed action is updated using importance sampling (line 6): the
reward is weighted by one over the probability of using the action. As a result, the expected
value of the cumulative reward estimated only from the time steps where the agent selected
the action is the same as the actual cumulative reward over all the time steps.
2.4.2 Regret matching
An alternative learning algorithm that allows minimizing regret in stochastic bandit setting
is regret matching (Hart and Mas-Colell, 2001), later generalized as polynomially weighted
average forecaster (Cesa-Bianchi and Lugosi, 2006). Regret matching (RM) corresponds to
selection of the parameter p = 2 in the more general formulation. It is a general procedure
originally developed for playing known general-sum matrix games in (Hart and Mas-Colell,
2000). The algorithm computes, for each action in each step, the regret for not playing
another fixed action every time the action has been played in the past. The action to be
played in the next round is selected randomly with probability proportional to the positive
portion of the regret for not playing the action. This procedure has been shown to converge
arbitrarily close to the set of correlated equilibria in general-sum games. As a result, it
converges to a Nash equilibrium in a zero-sum game. The regret matching procedure in
Hart and Mas-Colell (2000) requires the exact information about all utility values in the
game, as well as the action selected by the opponent in each step. In Hart and Mas-Colell
(2001), the authors modify the regret matching procedure and relax these requirements.
10
HC selection for MCTS in Simultaneous Move Games
Input: K - number of actions; γ - the amount of exploration
1: ∀i Ri ← 0
2: for t← 1, 2, . . . do
3: ∀i R+i ← max{0, Ri}
4: if
∑K
j=1R
+
j = 0 then
5: ∀i pi ← 1/K
6: else
7: ∀i pi ← (1− γt) R
+
i∑K
j=1R
+
j
+ γK
8: Use action It from distribution p and receive reward r
9: ∀i Ri ← Ri − r
10: RIt ← RIt + rpIt
Figure 4: regret matching variant for regret minimization in adversarial bandit setting.
Instead of computing the exact values for the regrets, the regrets are estimated in a similar
way as the cumulative rewards in Exp3. As a result, the modified regret matching procedure
is applicable in MAB.
We present the algorithm in Figure 4. The algorithm stores the estimates of the regrets
for not playing action i in all time steps in the past in variables Ri. On lines 3-7, it computes
the strategy for the current time step. If there is no positive regret for any action, a uniform
strategy is used (line 5). Otherwise, the strategy is chosen proportionally to the positive
part of the regrets (line 7). The uniform exploration with probability γ is added to the
strategy as in the case of Exp3. It also ensures that the addition on line 10 is bounded.
Cesa-Bianchi and Lugosi (2006) prove that regret matching eventually achieves zero
regret in the adversarial MAB problem, but they provide the exact finite time bound only
for the perfect-information case, where the agent learns rewards of all arms.
3. Convergence of SM-MCTS and SM-MCTS-A
In this section, we present the main theoretic results. Apart from a few cases, we will only
present the key ideas of the proofs here, while the full proofs can be found in the appendix.
We will assume without loss of generality that the game does not contain chance nodes
(that is, C = ∅); all of our results (apart from those in Section 3.2) are of an asymptotic
nature, and so they hold for general nonempty C, since we can always use the law of large
numbers to make the impact of chance nodes negligible after sufficiently high number of
iterations. We choose to omit the chance nodes in our analysis, since their introduction
would only require additional, purely technical, steps in the proofs, without shedding any
new light on the subject. For an overview of the notation we use, see Table 1.
In order to ensure that the SM-MCTS(-A) algorithm will eventually visit each node we
need the selection function to satisfy the following property.
Definition 5 We say that A is an algorithm with guaranteed exploration if, for players
1 and 2 both using A for action selection, limt→∞ tij = ∞ holds almost surely for each
(i, j) ∈ A1 ×A2.
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h ∈ H,A, D game nodes, action space, depth of the game tree
u, v, vh, dh utility, game value, subgame value, node depth
σ, σˆ, σ¯, br strategy, empirical st., average st., best response
NE, HC Nash equilibrium, Hannan consistent
UPO Unbiased payoff observations
SM-MCTS(-A) (averaged) simultaneous-move Monte Carlo tree search
MAB multi-armed bandit
i(t) (or also a(t)) action chosen at time t
ti, tij uses of action i (joint action (i,j)) up to time t
xi(t) reward assigned to an action i at time t
r(t), R(t) (average) external regret at time t
G, g,Gmax, gmax cumulative payoff (average, maximum, maximum average)
Exp3 Exponential-weight algorithm for Exploration and Exploitation
RM regret matching algorithm
CFR an algorithm for counterfactual regret minimization
γ exploration rate
C, c positive constants
η arbitrarily small positive number
expl exploitability of a strategy
pˆ empirical strategy with removed exploration
I indicator function
Table 1: The most common notation for quick reference
It is an immediate consequence of this definition that when an algorithm with guaranteed
exploration is used in SM-MCTS(-A), every node of the game tree will be visited indefinitely.
From now on, we will therefore assume that, at the start of our analysis, the full game tree
is already built - we do this, because it will always happen after a finite number of iterations
and, in most cases, we are only interested in the limit behavior of SM-MCTS(-A) (which is
not affected by the events in the first finitely many steps).
Note that most of the HC algorithms, namely RM and Exp3, guarantee exploration
without the need for any modifications. There exist some (mostly artificial) HC algorithms,
which do not have this property. However, they can always be adjusted in the following
way.
Definition 6 Let A be an algorithm used for choosing action in a matrix game M . For
fixed exploration parameter γ ∈ (0, 1) we define modified algorithm A∗ as follows: For time
s = 1, 2, ...: either explore with probability γ or run one iteration of A with probability 1−γ,
where “explore” means we choose the action randomly uniformly over available actions,
without updating any of the variables belonging to A.
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Fortunately, -Hannan consistency is not substantially influenced by the additional explo-
ration:
Lemma 7 Let A be an -Hannan consistent algorithm. Then A∗ is an ( + γ)-Hannan
consistent algorithm with guaranteed exploration.
3.1 Asymptotic convergence of SM-MCTS-A
The goal of this section is to prove the following Theorem 8. We will do so by backward
induction, stating firstly the required lemmas and definitions. The Theorem 8 itself will
then follow from the Corollary 12.
Theorem 8 Let G be a zero-sum game with perfect information and simultaneous moves
with maximal depth D and let A be an -Hannan consistent algorithm with guaranteed
exploration, which we use as a selection policy for SM-MCTS-A.
Then for arbitrarily small η > 0, there almost surely exists t0, so that the empirical
frequencies (σˆ1(t), σˆ2(t)) form a subgame-perfect
(2D (D + 1) + η) -equilibrium for all t ≥ t0.
In other words, the average strategy will eventually get arbitrarily close to C-equilibrium.
In particular a Hannan-consistent algorithm ( = 0) will eventually get arbitrarily close
to Nash equilibrium. This also illustrates why we cannot remove the number η, as even
a HC algorithm might not reach NE in finite time. In the following η > 0 will denote an
arbitrarily small number. As η can be chosen independently of everything else, we will not
focus on the constants in front of it, writing simply η instead of 2η etc.
It is well-known that two Hannan consistent players will eventually converge to NE in a
matrix game - see Waugh (2009) and Blum and Mansour (2007). We prove a similar result
for the approximate versions of the notions.
Lemma 9 Let  ≥ 0 be a real number. If both players in a matrix game M are -Hannan
consistent, then the following inequalities hold for the empirical frequencies almost surely:
v −  ≤ lim inf
t→∞ g(t) ≤ lim supt→∞ g(t) ≤ v + , (3)
v − 2 ≤ lim inf
t→∞ u (σˆ1(t), br) & lim supt→∞
u (br, σˆ2(t)) ≤ v + 2. (4)
The inequalities (3) are a consequence of the definition of -HC and the game value v.
The proof of inequality (4) then shows that if the value caused by the empirical frequencies
was outside of the interval infinitely many times with positive probability, it would be in
contradiction with definition of -HC. Next, we present the induction hypothesis around
which the proof of Theorem 8 revolves.
Induction hypothesis (IHd) : For a node h in the game tree, we denote by dh the depth
of the tree rooted at h (not including the terminal states - therefore when dh = 1, the node
is a matrix game). Let d ∈ {1, ..., droot}. Induction hypothesis (IHd) is then the claim
that for each node h with dh = d, there almost surely exists t0 such that for each t ≥ t0
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1. the payoff gh(t) will fall into the interval
(
vh − Cd, vh + Cd
)
;
2. the utilities u (σˆ1(t), br) ≤ u (br, σˆ2(t)) with respect to the matrix game
(
vhij
)
, will
fall into the interval
(
vh − 2Cd, vh + 2Cd
)
;
where Cd = d+ η and v
h
ij is the value of subgame rooted at the child node of h indexed by
ij.
Note that Lemma 9 ensures that (IH1) holds. Our goal is to prove 2. for every h ∈ H,
which then implies the main result. However, for the induction itself to work, the condition
1. is required. We now introduce the necessary technical tools.
Definition 10 Let M = (aij) be a matrix game. For t ∈ N we define M(t) = (aij(t)) to
be a game, in which if players chose actions i and j, they observe (randomized) payoffs
aij (t, (i(1), ...i(t− 1)), (j(1), ...j(t− 1))). We will denote these simply as aij(t), but in fact
they are random variables with values in [0, 1] and their distribution in time t depends on
the previous choices of actions.
We say that M(t) = (aij(t)) is a repeated game with error e, if there almost surely
exists t0 ∈ N, such that |aij(t)− aij | < e holds for some matrix (aij) and all t ≥ t0. By
symbols G(t), R(T ), r(t) (and so on) we will denote the payoffs, regrets and other variables
related to the distorted payoffs aij(t). On the other hand, by symbol u(σ) we will refer to
the utility of strategy σ with respect to the matrix game (aij).
The intuition behind this definition is that the players are repeatedly playing the original
matrix gameM - but for some reason, they receive imprecise information about their payoffs.
The application we are interested in is the following: we take a node h inside the game tree.
The matrix game without error is the matrix game M = (vij), where vij are the values of
subgames nested at h. By (IHdh−1), the payoffs received in h during SM-MCTS-A can be
described as a repeated game with error, where the observed payoffs are ghij .
The following proposition is an analogy of Lemma 9 for repeated games with error. It
shows that an -HC algorithms will still perform well even if they observe slightly perturbed
rewards.
Proposition 11 Let M = (vij) be a matrix game with value v and , c ≥ 0. If M(t) is
corresponding repeated game with error c and both players are -Hannan consistent, then
the following inequalities hold almost surely:
v − (c+ 1) ≤ lim inf
t→∞ g(t) ≤ lim supt→∞ g(t) ≤ v + (c+ 1), (5)
v − 2(c+ 1) ≤ lim inf
t→∞ u (σˆ1, br) ≤ lim supt→∞ u (br, σˆ2) ≤ v + 2(c+ 1). (6)
The proof is similar to the proof of Lemma 9. It needs an additional claim that if the
algorithm is -HC with respect to the observed values with errors, it still has a bounded
regret with respect to the exact values.
Corollary 12 (IHd) =⇒ (IHd+1).
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Proof Property 1. of (IHd) implies that every node h with dh ≤ d is a repeated game with
error d + η. Proposition 11 then implies that any h with dh = d + 1 is again a repeated
game with error, and by inequality (5) the value of error increases to (d+ 1)  + η, which
gives (IHd+1).
Recall here the following well-known fact:
Remark 13 In a zero-sum game with value v the following implication holds:(
u1(br, σˆ2) < v +

2
and u1(σˆ1, br) > v − 
2
)
=⇒
(u1(br, σˆ2)− u1(σˆ1, σˆ2) <  and u2(σˆ1, br)− u2(σˆ1, σˆ2) < ) def⇐⇒
(σˆ1, σˆ2) is an -equilibrium.
The following example demonstrates that the above implication would not hold if we
replaced /2 by . Consider the following game
0.4 0.5
0.6 0.5
with a strategy profile (1,0), (1,0). The value of the game is v = 0.5, u(br, (1, 0)) = 0.6 and
u((1, 0), br) = 0.4. The best responses to the strategies of both players are 0.1 from the game
value, but (1, 0), (1, 0) is a 0.2-NE, since player 1 can improve by 0.2.
Proof [Proof of Theorem 8] First, we observe that by Lemma 9, (IH1) holds, and conse-
quently by Corollary 12, (IHd) holds for every d = 1, ..., D. Denote by u
h(σ) (resp. uhij(σ))
the expected payoff corresponding to the strategy σ used in the subgame rooted at node
h ∈ H (resp. its child). Remark 13 then states that, in order to prove Theorem 8, it is
enough to show that for every h ∈ H, the strategy σˆ (t) will eventually satisfy
uh (br, σˆ2 (t)) ≤ vh + (dh + 1) dh+ η. (7)
We will do this by backward induction. The property 1. from (IH1) implies that the
inequality (7) holds for nodes h with dh = 1. Let 1 < d ≤ D, h ∈ H be such that dh = d
and assume, as a hypothesis for backward induction, that the inequality (7) holds for each
h′ with dh′ < d. We observe that
uh (br, σˆ2 (t)) = max
i
∑
j
σˆ2 (t) (j)u
hij (br, σˆ2 (t))
≤ vh +
max
i
∑
j
σˆ2 (t) (j) v
h
ij − vh
+
+ max
i
∑
j
σˆ2 (t) (j)
(
uhij (br, σˆ2 (t))− vhij
)
.
By property 2. in (IHd) the first term in the brackets is at most 2d+ η. By the backward
induction hypothesis we have
uhij (br, σˆ2 (t))− vhij ≤ d (d− 1) + η
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Therefore we have
uh (br, σˆ2 (t)) ≤ vh + 2d+ d (d− 1) + η = vh + (d+ 1) d+ η.
For d = D and h = root, Remark 13 implies that (σˆ1 (t) , σˆ2 (t)) will form (2D (D + 1) + η)-
equilibrium of the whole game.
3.2 SM-MCTS-A finite time bound
In this section, we find a probabilistic finite time bound on the performance of HC algorithms
in SM-MCTS-A. We do this by taking the propositions from Section 3.1 and working with
their quantified versions.
Theorem 14 (Finite time bound for SM-MCTS-A) Consider the following setting:
A game with at most b actions at each node h ∈ H and depth D, played by SM-MCTS-
A using an -Hannan consistent algorithm A with exploration γ. Fix δ > 0. Then with
probability at least 1 − (2 |H|+D) δ, the empirical frequencies will form an 4D (D + 1) -
equilibrium for every t ≥ T0, where
T0 = 16
D−1−(D−1)
(
b
γ
)D
2
(D−1)
log (2 |H| − 2)TA (, δ)
and TA (, δ) is the time needed for A to have with probability at least 1 − δ regret below 
for all t ≥ TA(, δ).
We obtain this bound by going through the proof of Theorem 8 in more detail, replacing
statements of the type “inequality of limits holds” by “for all t ≥ t0 a slightly worse
inequality holds with probability at least 1− δ”. We also note that the actual convergence
will be faster than the one stated above, because the theorem relies on quantification of the
guaranteed exploration property (necessary for our proof), rather than the fact that MCTS
attempts to solve the exploration-exploitation problem (the major reason for its popularity
in practice).
3.3 Asymptotic convergence of SM-MCTS
We would like to prove an analogy of Theorem 8 for SM-MCTS. Unfortunately, such a goal
is unattainable in general - in Section 5 we present a counterexample, showing that a such a
theorem with no additional assumptions does not hold. Instead we define, for an algorithm
A, the property of having -unbiased payoff observations (-UPO, see Definition 18) and
prove the following Theorem 15 for -HC algorithms with this property. We were unable to
prove that specific -HC algorithms have this -UPO property, but instead, later in Section
6, we provide empirical evidence supporting our hypothesis that the “typical” algorithms,
such as regret matching or Exp3, indeed do have -unbiased payoff observations.
Theorem 15 Let A be an -HC algorithm with guaranteed exploration that has -UPO. If
A is used as selection policy for SM-MCTS, then the average strategy of A will eventually
get arbitrarily close to C-NE of the whole game, where C = 12
(
2D − 1)− 8D.
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We now present the notation required for the definition of the -UPO property, and then
proceed to the proof of Theorem 15. As we will see, the structure of this proof is similar to
the structure of Section 3.1, but some of the propositions have slightly different form.
3.3.1 Definition of the UPO property
Notation 16 Let h ∈ H be a node. We will take a closer look at what is happening at h.
Let hij be the children of h. Since the events in h and above do not affect what happens in hij
(only the time when does it happen), we denote by sij (1) , sij (2) , ... the sequence of payoffs
we get for sampling hij for the first time, the second time and so on. The correspondence
between these numbers sij and the payoffs xij observed in h is xij (t) = sij
(
(t− 1)ij + 1
)
,
where (t− 1)ij is the number of uses of joint action (i, j) up to time t− 1.
Note that all of these objects are, in fact, random variables and their distribution de-
pends on the used selection policy. By s¯ij (n) =
1
n
∑n
m=1 sij (m) we denote the standard
arithmetical average of sij. Finally, setting t
∗
ij (k) = min {t ∈ N| tij = k}, we define the
weights wij (k) and the weighted average s˜ij (k):
wij (n) = 1 +
∣∣{t ∈ N| t∗ij (n− 1) ≤ t ≤ t∗ij (n) & t satisfies j(t) = j but i(t) 6= i}∣∣ ,
s˜ij (n) =
1∑n
m=1wij (m)
n∑
m=1
wij (m) sij (m) .
Remark 17 (Motivation for the definition of UPO property) If our algorithm A is
-HC, we know that if hij is a node with dhij = 1 and value vij, then lim supn |s¯ij (n)− vij | ≤
 (Lemma 9 (3), where g (n) = s¯ij (n)). In more vague words, “we have some information
about s¯ij”, therefore, we would prefer to work with these “simple” averages. Unfortunately,
the variables, which naturally appear in the context of SM-MCTS are the “complicated”
averages s˜ij - we will see this in the proof of Theorem 15 and it also follows from the fact
that, in general, there is no relation between quality the performance of SM-MCTS and the
value of differences s¯ij (n) − vij (see Section 5.2 for a counterexample). This leads to the
following definition:
Definition 18 (UPO) We say that an algorithm A guarantees -unbiased payoff observa-
tions, if for every (simultaneous-move zero-sum perfect information) game G, every node h
and actions i, j, the arithmetic averages s¯ij and weighted averages s˜ij almost surely satisfy
lim sup
t→∞
|s˜ij (n)− s¯ij (n)| ≤ .
We will sometimes abbreviate this by saying that “A is -UPO algorithm”.
Observe that this in particular implies that if, for some c > 0,
lim sup
n→∞
|s¯ij (n)− vij | ≤ c
holds almost surely, then we also have
lim sup
n→∞
|s˜ij (n)− vij | ≤ (c+ 1)  a.s..
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Next, we present a few examples which motivate the above definition and support the
discussion that follows.
Example 1 (Examples related to the UPO property)
1. Suppose that wij(n), sij(n), n ∈ N do not necessarily originate from SM-MCTS algo-
rithm, but assume they satisfy:
(a) wij(n), sij(n), n ∈ N are independent
(b) ∃C > 0 ∀n ∈ N : wij(n) ∈ [0, C]
(c) ∀n ∈ N : sij(n) ∈ [0, 1] & E[|sij(n)− vij |] ≤ 2 for some vij ∈ [0, 1].
Then, by strong law of large numbers, we almost surely have
lim sup
n→∞
|s¯ij(n)− s˜ij(n)| ≤ . (8)
2. The previous case can be generalized in many ways - for example it is sufficient to
replace bounded wij(n) by ones satisfying
∃q ∈ (0, 1) ∀n ∀i, j : Pr[wij(n) ≥ k] ≤ qk
(an assumption which holds with q = γ/ |A1(h)| when wij(n), sij(n) originate from
SM-MCTS with fixed exploration). Also, the variables wij(n), sij(n) do not have to
be fully independent - it might be enough if the correlation between each sij(n) and
wij(n) was “low enough for most n ∈ N”.
3. In Section 6 we provide empirical evidence, which suggests that when the variables
sij(n), wij(n) originate from SM-MCTS with Exp3 or RM selection policy, then the
assertion (8) of 1. holds as well (and thus these two -HC algorithms are -UPO).
4. Assume that (sij(n))
∞
n=1 = (1, 0, 1, 0, 1, ...) and (wij(n))
∞
n=1 = (1, 3, 1, 3, 1, ...). Then
we have s¯ij(n)→ 12 , but s˜ij(n)→ 14 .
5. In Section 5.2 we construct an example of -HC algorithm, based on 4., such that when
it is used as a selection policy in a certain game, we have lim sup
n→∞
|s¯ij(n)− s˜ij(n)| ≥ 14 .
The cases 2. and 3. from Example 1 suggest that it is possible to prove that specific -HC
algorithms are -UPO. On the other hand, 5. shows that the implication (A is -HC =⇒
A is C-UPO) does not hold, no matter how high C > 0 we choose. Also, the guarantees we
have about the behavior of, for example, Exp3 are much weaker than the assumptions made
in 1 - there is no independence between wij(n), sij(m), m, n ∈ N, at best we can use some
martingale theory. Moreover, even in nodes h ∈ H with dh = 1, we have lim sup
n→∞
|s¯ij(n) −
vij | ≤ , instead of assumption (c) from 1.. This implies that the proof that specific -HC
algorithms are -UPO will not be trivial.
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3.3.2 The proof of Theorem 15
The following proposition shows that if the assumption holds, then having low regret in
some h ∈ H with respect to observed rewards is sufficient to bound the regret with respect
to the rewards originating from the matrix game (vij).
Proposition 19 Let h ∈ H and , c ≥ 0. Let A be an -HC algorithm which generates
the sequence of actions (i(t)) at h and suppose that the adversary chooses actions (j(t)). If
lim sup
n→∞
|s¯ij (n)− vij | ≤ c holds a.s. for each i, j and A is -UPO, then we almost surely
have
lim sup
t→∞
1
t
(
max
i(0)
t∑
s=1
vi(0)j(s) −
t∑
s=1
vi(s)j(s)
)
≤ 2 (c+ 1) . (9)
Consequently the choice of actions (i(t)) made by the algorithm A is 2 (c+ 1) -HC with
respect to the matrix game (vij).
The proof of this proposition consists of rewriting the sums in inequality (9) and using the
fact that the weighted averages s˜ij are close to the standard averages s¯ij . Denote by
(
IH
′
d
)
the claim, which is the same as (IHd) from paragraph 3.1 except that it concerns SM-MCTS
algorithm rather than SM-MCTS-A and Cd = 3 ·2d−1−2. Lemma 9 then immediately gives
the following corollary. Analogously to the Section 3.1, this in turn implies the main theorem
of this section, the proof of which is similar to the proof of Theorem 8.
Corollary 20
(
IH
′
d
)
=⇒
(
IH
′
d+1
)
.
Proof By Lemma 9, the implication holds for some constants Cd. It remains to show that
Cd = 3 · 2d−1 − 2. We proceed by backward induction - since the algorithm A is -HC,
we know that, by Lemma 9,
(
IH
′
1
)
holds with C1 = 1. For d ≥ 2, Proposition 19 implies
Cd+1 = 2 (Cd + 1). A classical induction then gives the result.
Proof [Proof of theorem 15] Using Corollary 20, the proof is identical to the proof of
Theorem 8 - it remains to determine the new value of C. As in the proof of Theorem 8 we
have C = 2 · 2∑Dd=1Cd, and we need to calculate this sum:
D∑
d=1
Cd =
D∑
d=1
(
3 · 2d−1 − 2
)
= 3
(
1 + ...+ 2D−1
)− 2D = 3 (2D − 1)− 2D.
4. Exploitability and exploration removal
One of the most common measure of the quality of a strategy in imperfect information
games is the notion of exploitability (for example, Johanson et al., 2011). It will be useful
for the empirical evaluation of our main result in Section 6, as well as for the discussion of
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lower bounds in Section 5. In this section, we first recall the definition of this notion and
we follow with few observations concerning which strategy should be considered the output
of SM-MCTS(-A) algorithms.
Definition 21 Exploitability of strategy σ1 of player 1 is the quantity
expl1 (σ1) := v − u (σ1, br) ,
where v is the value of the game and br is a second player’s best response strategy to σ1.
Analogously we define expl2 for the second player’s strategies.
Clearly we always have expli (σi) ≥ 0, i = 1, 2 and a strategy profile σ = (σ1, σ2) is a Nash
equilibrium iff expl1 (σ1) = expl2 (σ2) = 0.
Remark 22 (Removing the exploration) In SM-MCTS(-A) we often use a selection
function with fixed exploration parameter γ > 0, such that the algorithm is guaranteed to
converge to Cγ-equilibrium for some constant C > 0 (for example Exp3 or regret matching).
Teytaud and Flory (2011) suggest removing the random noise caused by this exploration
from the resulting strategies, but they do it heuristically and do not formally analyze this
procedure. By definition of exploration, the average strategy (σ¯1(t), σ¯2(t)) produced by SM-
MCTS(-A) algorithms is of the form
σ¯i (t) = (1− γ) p¯i (t) + γ · rnd
for some strategy p¯i (t), where rnd is the strategy used when exploring, assigning to each
action the same probability.
In general, rnd will not be an equilibrium strategy of our game. This means that for
small values of γ and high enough t, so that the algorithms have time to converge (that is
when σ¯i (t) is reasonably good), we have
expli (rnd) > Cγ ≥ expli (σ¯i (t)) .
And finally since the function expli is linear, we have
Cγ ≥ expli (σ¯i (t))
= (1− γ) expli (p¯i (t)) + γ · expli (rnd)
≥ (1− γ) expli (p¯i (t)) + γ · Cγ.
This necessarily implies that expli (p¯i (t)) ≤ expli (σ¯i (t)).
We can summarize this remark by the following proposition (the proof of which consists of
using the fact that utility is a linear function):
Proposition 23 Let σ¯ (t) = (σ¯1 (t) , σ¯2 (t)) be the average strategy. Let γ > 0 and set
p¯i (t) :=
1
(1− γ) σ¯i (t)−
γ
(1− γ)rnd.
Then the following holds:
(1) expli (p¯i (t)) ≤ expli (σ¯i (t)) + γ/ (1− γ).
(2) If expli (rnd) > Cγ ≥ expli (σ¯i (t)) holds for some C > 0, then the strategy p¯i (t) satisfies
expli (p¯i (t)) < expli (σ¯i (t)).
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Figure 5: A single-player game where the quality of a strategy has linear dependence on
the exploration parameter and on the game depth D. The numbers ud satisfy 0 < u1 <
u2 < · · · < uD < 1.
Less formally speaking, there are two possibilities. First is that our algorithm had so
little time to converge that it is better to disregard its output σ¯i (t) and play randomly
instead. If this is not the case, then by (2) it is always better to remove the exploration
and use the strategy p¯i(t) instead of σ¯i (t). And by (1), even if we remove the exploration,
we cannot increase the exploitability of p¯i(t) by more than γ/(1− γ). We illustrate this by
experiments presented in Section 6, where we compare the quality of strategies p¯1 (t) and
σ¯1 (t).
5. Counterexample and lower bounds
In this section we first show that the dependence of constant C from Theorems 8 and 15
on the depth D of the game tree cannot be improved below linear dependence. Main result
of this section is then an example showing that, without the -UPO property, Theorem 15
does not hold.
5.1 Dependence of the eventual NE distance on the game depth
Proposition 24 There exists k > 0, such that none of the Theorems 8 and 15 hold if the
constant C is replaced by C˜ = kD. This remains true even when the exploration is removed
from the strategy σˆ.
The proposition above follows from Example 2.
Example 2 Let G be the single player game1 from Figure 5, η > 0 some small number,
and D the depth of the game tree. Let Exp3 with exploration parameter γ = k be our -HC
algorithm (for a suitable choice of k). We recall that this algorithm will eventually identify
the optimal action and play it with frequency 1− γ, and it will choose randomly otherwise.
Denote the available actions at each node as (up, right, down), resp. (right, down) at the
rightmost inner node. We define each of the rewards ud, d = 1, ..., D− 1 in such a way that
Exp3 will always prefer to go up, rather than right. By induction over d, we can see that
the choice u1 = 1 − γ/2 + η, ud+1 = (1 − γ/3)ud is sufficient and for η small enough, we
have
uD−1 = (1− γ
2
+ η)(1− γ
3
) . . . (1− γ
3
) ≤
(
1− γ
3
)D−1 .
= 1− D − 1
3
γ
1. The other player always has only a single no-op action.
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(where by
.
= we mean that for small γ, in which we are interested, the difference between the
two terms is negligible). Consequently in each of the nodes, Exp3 will converge to the strategy(
1− 23γ, 13γ, 13γ
)
(resp.
(
1− γ2 , γ2
)
), which yields the payoff of approximately (1−γ/3)uD−1.
Clearly, the expected utility of such a strategy is approximately
u = (1− γ/3)D .= 1− D
3
γ.
On the other hand, the optimal strategy of always going right leads to utility 1, and thus
our strategy σˆ is D3 γ-equilibrium.
Note that in this particular example, it makes no difference whether SM-MCTS or SM-
MCTS-A is used. We also observe that when the exploration is removed, the new strategy
is to go up at the first node with probability 1, which again leads to regret of approximately
D
3 γ.
By increasing the branching factor of the game in the previous example from 3 to b (adding
more copies of the “0” nodes) and modifying the values of ud accordingly, we could make
the above example converge to 2 b−2b Dγ-equilibrium (resp.
b−2
b Dγ once the exploration is
removed).
In fact, we were able to construct a game of depth D and -HC algorithms, such that the
resulting strategy σˆ converged to 3D-equilibrium (2D after removing the exploration).
However, the -HC algorithms used in this example are non-standard and would require
the introduction of more technical notation. Therefore, since in our main theorem we use
quadratic dependence C = kD2, we instead choose to highlight the following open question:
Problem 25 Does Theorem 8 (and Theorem 15) hold with C = kD for some k > 0 (or is
the presented bound tight)?
It is our hypothesis that the answer is affirmative (and possibly the values k = 3, resp.
k = 2 after exploration removal, are optimal), but the proof of such proposition would
require techniques different from the one used in the proof of Theorem 8.
5.2 Counterexample for Theorem 15
Recall that in Section 3 we proved two theorems of the following form:
Proposition 26 Let A be an -HC algorithm with guaranteed exploration and let G be
(zero-sum simultaneous moves perfect information) game. If A is used as selection policy
for SM-MCTS(-A), then the empirical frequencies will eventually get arbitrarily close to
C-NE of the whole game, for some C > 0.
The goal of this subsection is to prove the following theorem:
Theorem 27 There exists a simultaneous move zero-sum game G with perfect information
and a 0-HC algorithm A with guaranteed exploration, such that when A is used as a strategy
for SM-MCTS algorithm (rather than SM-MCTS-A), then the average strategy σˆ (t) almost
surely does not converge to the set of 14 -Nash equilibria of G.
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This in particular implies that no theorem similar to Proposition 26 holds for SM-MCTS,
unless A satisfies some additional assumptions, such as being an -UPO algorithm.
We now present some observations regarding the proof of Theorem 27.
Remark 28 Firstly, it is enough to find the game G and construct for each  > 0 an
algorithm A which is -HC, but σˆ (t) does not converge to the set of
1
4 -NE. From these
-HC algorithms A, the desired 0-HC algorithm can be constructed in a standard way - that
is using 1-Hannan consistent algorithm A1 for some period t1, then
1
2 -HC algorithm A1/2
for a longer period t2 and so on. By choosing a sequence (tn)n, which increases quickly
enough, we can guarantee that the resulting combination of algorithms
(
A1/n
)
is 0-Hannan
consistent.
Furthermore, we can assume without loss of generality that the algorithm A knows if
it is playing as the first or the second player and that in each node of the game, we can
actually use a different algorithm A. This is true, because the algorithm always accepts a
number of available actions as input. Therefore we could define the algorithm differently
based on this number, and modify our game G in some trivial way (such as duplicating rows
or columns) which would not affect our example.
The structure of the proof of Theorem 27 is now as follows. First, in Example 3, we
introduce game G and a sequence of joint actions leading to∑
h∈H
rh(th(T )) = 0 & rG(T ) =
1
4
.
This behavior will serve as a basis for our counterexample. However, the “algorithms”
generating this sequence of actions will be oblivious to the actions of opponent, which means
that they will not be -HC. In the second step of our proof, we modify these algorithms in
such a way that the resulting sequence of joint actions stays similar to the original sequence,
but the new algorithms are -HC. Theorem 27 then follows from Lemma 30 and Remark
28.
Example 3 The game: Let G be the game from Figure 6.
Behavior at J : At the node J , the players repeat (not counting the iterations when the
play does not reach J) the pattern (U,L), (U,R), (D,R), (D,L), generating payoff sequence
sY (1) , sY (2) , ... = 1, 0, 1, 0, ....
Looking at time steps of the form t = 4k, k ∈ N, the average strategy J will then be
σˆJ1 = σˆ
J
2 =
(
1
2 ,
1
2
)
and the corresponding payoff of the maximizing player 1 is 12 . Note that
neither of the players could improve his utility at J by changing all his actions to any single
action, therefore for both players, we have rJ(t) = 0.
Behavior at I: Let T = 4k. At the node I, player 1 repeatedly plays Y,X,X, Y, .... For
iteration t and action a, we denote by xa(t) the reward we would receive if we played a at
node I at time t, provided we repeated the Y,X,X, Y pattern up to iteration t− 1 and used
the above defined behavior at J (formally we have xX(t) = 0, xY (t) = sY ((t− 1)Y + 1),
where, as always, (t−1)Y denotes the number of uses of action Y up to time t−1). Denote
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by a(t) the action played at time t. The payoffs xa(t) we actually do receive will then form
a 4-periodic sequence
xY (1) = 1, xX (2) = 0, xX (3) = 0, xY (4) = 0.
Clearly if we change the strategy from the current σI =
(
1
2 ,
1
2
)
to (0, 1), we would receive an
average payoff 12 . This means that the average overall regret of the whole game G for player
1 is equal to rG(T ) = 14 . However, if we look only at the situation at node I and represent
it as a bandit problem, we see that the payoff sequence xY (1) , xY (2) , ... for action Y will
be 1, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0, ... (while xX (t) = 0 for each t). At first, this might seem strange, but
note that the reward for action Y does not change when X is chosen. This implies that,
from the MAB point of view, the player believes he cannot receive an average payoff higher
than 14 and thus he observes no regret and r
I(T ) = 0.
Remark 29 Recall here the definition of -UPO property of an algorithm, which requires
the “observed average payoffs” s˜a(t) for all actions a to be close to the real average payoffs
s¯a(t). In this case, we have s¯B(t) =
1
2 and s˜B(t) =
1
4 , which means that the above algorithm
is far from being -UPO.
Figure 6: Example of a game in which it is possible to minimize regret at each of the nodes
while having high overall regret.
Lemma 30 Let G be the game from Figure 6. Then for each  > 0 there exist -HC
algorithms A
I
, A
J
1
, A
J
2
, such that when these algorithms are used for SM-MCTS in G, the
resulting average strategy ˆσ (t) converges to ˆσ
I
= ˆσ
J
1
= ˆσ
I
2
=
(
1
2
,
1
2
)
.
As noted in Example 3, the strategy ˆσ satisfies u
1
(ˆσ) =
1
4
, while the equilibrium strategy
pi, where pi
I
= (0, 1), pi
J
1
= pi
J
2
=
(
1
2
,
1
2
)
, gives utility u
1
(pi) =
1
2
. Therefore the existence of
algorithms from Lemma 30 proves Theorem 27.
The key idea behind Lemma 30 is the following: both players repeat the pattern from
Example 3, but we let them perform random checks which detect any adversary who deviates
enough to change the average payoff. If the players repeat the pattern, by the previous
example they observe no regret at any of the nodes. On the other hand, if one of them
deviates significantly, he will be detected by the other player, who then switches to a “safe”
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-HC algorithm, leading again to a low regret. The definition of the modified algorithms
used in Lemma 30, along with the proof of their properties, can be found in the appendix.
We recall that there exists an algorithm, called CFR (Zinkevich et al., 2007), which
provably converges in our setting. The following remark explains why the proof of its
convergence cannot be simply modified to work for SM-MCTS(-A), but a new proof had to
be found instead.
Remark 31 (CFR and bounding game regret by sum of node regrets) The conver-
gence of CFR algorithm relies on two facts: firstly, in each node h ∈ H, the algorithm mini-
mizes so called average immediate counterfactual regret, which we denote here by Rh,+imm(T )/T .
Secondly, the overall average regret in the whole game, which we denote by rG(T ), can be
bounded by the sum of “local” regrets in the game nodes:
rG(T ) ≤
∑
h∈H
Rh,+imm(T )/T (10)
(Theorem 3 by Zinkevich et al., 2007). It is then well known that when both players have
low overall regret rG(T ), the average strategy is close to an equilibrium.
We now look at the similarities between this situation for CFR and for SM-MCTS. -HC
algorithms, used by SM-MCTS, guarantee that the average regret rh(t) is, in the limit, at
most  at every h ∈ H. In other words, SM-MCTS also minimizes some kind of regret in
each of the nodes h ∈ I, like CFR does. It is then logical to ask whether it is also possible
to bound rG(T ) by the sum of “local” regrets
∑
h∈H r
h(th(T )), like for counterfactual regret
in CFR (where by th(T ) we denote the “local time” at node h, or more precisely the number
of visits of node h during SM-MCTS iterations 1,...,T). The following proposition, which is
an immediate consequence of Theorem 27, gives a negative answer to this question.
Corollary 32 There exists a game G and α > 0, such that for every β > 0, there exists a
sequence of joint actions resulting in∑
h∈H
rh(th(T )) < β & α ≤ rG(T ).
In particular, the inequality rG(T ) ≤∑h∈H rh(th(T )) does not hold and this approach which
worked for CFR cannot be applied to SM-MCTS. Intuitively, this is caused by the differences
between the two distinct notions of regret used by SM-MCTS and CFR.
6. Experimental evaluation
In this section, we present the experimental data related to our theoretical results. First,
we empirically evaluate our hypothesis that Exp3 and regret matching algorithms ensure
the -UPO property. Second, we test the empirical convergence rates of SM-MCTS and
SM-MCTS-A on synthetic games as well as smaller variants of games played by people.
We investigate the practical dependence of the convergence error based on the important
parameters of the games and evaluate the effect of removing the samples due to exploration
from the computed strategies.
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Figure 7: The Anti game used for evaluation of the algorithms.
6.1 Experimental Domains
Goofspiel Goofspiel is a card game that appears in many works dedicated to simultaneous-
move games (for example Ross (1971); Rhoads and Bartholdi (2012); Saffidine et al. (2012);
Lanctot et al. (2014); Bosˇansky´ et al. (2013)). There are 3 identical decks of cards with
values {0, . . . , (d−1)} (one for nature and one for each player). Value of d is a parameter of
the game. The deck for the nature is shuffled at the beginning of the game. In each round,
nature reveals the top card from its deck. Each player selects any of their remaining cards
and places it face down on the table so that the opponent does not see the card. Afterwards,
the cards are turned face up and the player with the higher card wins the card revealed by
nature. The card is discarded in case of a draw. At the end, the player with the higher
sum of the nature cards wins the game or the game is a draw. People play the game with
13 cards, but we use smaller numbers in order to be able to compute the distance from the
equilibrium (that is, exploitability) in a reasonable time. We further simplify the game by a
common assumption that both players know the sequence of the nature’s cards in advance.
Oshi-Zumo Each player in Oshi-Zumo (for example, Buro (2004)) starts with N coins,
and a one-dimensional playing board with 2K + 1 locations (indexed 0, . . . , 2K) stretches
between the players. At the beginning, there is a stone (or a wrestler) located in the center
of the board (that is, at position K). During each move, both players simultaneously place
their bid from the amount of coins they have (but at least one if they still have some coins).
Afterwards, the bids are revealed, the coins used for bids are removed from the game, and
the highest bidder pushes the wrestler one location towards the opponent’s side. If the bids
are the same, the wrestler does not move. The game proceeds until the money runs out for
both players, or the wrestler is pushed out of the board. The player closer to the wrestler’s
final position loses the game. If the final position of the wrestler is the center, the game is
a draw. In our experiments, we use a version with K = 2 and N = 5.
Random Game In order to achieve more general results, we also use randomly generated
games. The games are defined by the number of actions B available to each player in each
decision point and a depth D (D = 0 for leaves), which is the same for all branches. The
utility values in the leafs are selected randomly form a uniform distribution over 〈0, 1〉.
Anti The last game we use in our evaluation is based on the well-known single player
game, which demonstrates the super-exponential convergence time of the UCT algorithm
(Coquelin and Munos, 2007). The game is depicted in Figure 7. In each stage, it deceives
the MCTS algorithm to end the game while it is optimal to continue until the end.
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Figure 8: The maximum of the bias in payoff observations in MCTS without averaging the
sample values.
6.2 -UPO property
In order to be able to apply Theorem 15 (that is, convergence of SM-MCTS without av-
eraging) to Exp3 and regret matching, the selection algorithms have to assure the -UPO
property for some . So far, we were unable to prove this hypothesis. Instead, we support
this claim by the following numerical experiments. Recall that having -UPO property is
defined as the claim that for every game node h ∈ H and every joint action (i, j) available at
h, the difference |s¯ij (n)− s˜ij (n)| between the weighted and arithmetical averages decreases
below , as the number n of uses of (i, j) at h increases to infinity.
We measured the value of this sum in the root node of the four domains described above.
Besides the random games, the depth of the game was set to 5. For the random games,
the depth and the branching factor was B = D = 3. Figure 8 presents one graph for each
domain and each algorithm. The x-axis is the number of iterations and the y-axis depicts
the maximum value of the sum from the iteration on the x-axis to the end of the run of
the algorithm. The presented value is the maximum from 50 runs of the algorithms. For
all games, the difference eventually converges to zero. Generally, larger exploration ensures
that the difference goes to zero more quickly and the bias in payoff observation is smaller.
The main reason for the bias is easy to explain in the Anti game. Figure 9a presents the
maximal values of the bias in small time windows during the convergence from all 50 runs. It
is apparent that the bias during the convergence tends to jump very high (higher for smaller
exploration) and then gradually decrease. This, however, happens only until certain point
in time. The reason for this behavior is that if the algorithm learns an action is good in a
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Figure 9: The dependence of the current value of |s¯ij (n)− s˜ij (n)| on the number of itera-
tions that used the given joint action in (a) Anti game and (b) Goofspiel with 4 cards per
deck.
specific state, it will use it very often and do the updates for the action with much smaller
weight in s˜ij (n) than the updates for the other action. However, when the other action later
proves to be substantially better, the value of that action starts increasing rather quickly.
At the same time, its probability of being played starts increasing and as a result, the
weights used for the received rewards start decreasing. This will cause a strong dependence
between the rewards and the weights, which causes the bias. With smaller exploration, it
takes more time to identify the better alternative action; hence, when it happens, the wrong
action has already accumulated larger reward and the discrepancy between the right values
and the probability of playing the actions is even stronger.
We also tested satisfaction of the UPO property in the root node of depth 4 Goofspiel,
using Exp3 algorithm and exploration  = 0.001. The results in Figure 9b indicate that
Exp3 with exploration 0.001 possesses the 0.001-UPO property, however this time, much
higher n0 is required (around 5 · 106).
We can divide the joint actions (i, j) at the root into three groups: (1) the actions which
both players play (nearly) only when exploring, (2) the actions which one of the players
chooses only because of the exploration, and (3) the actions which none of the players uses
only because of the exploration. In Figure 9b, (1) is on the left, (2) in the middle and (3) on
the right. The third type of actions easily satisfied |s¯ij (n)− s˜ij (n)| ≤ , while for the second
type, this inequality seems to eventually hold as well. The shape of the graphs suggests that
the difference between s¯ij (n) and s˜ij (n) will eventually get below  as well, however, the
109 iterations we used were not sufficient for this to happen. Luckily, even if the inequality
did not hold for these cases, it does not prevent the convergence of SM-MCTS algorithm
to an approximate equilibrium. In the proof of Proposition 19, the term |s¯ij (n)− s˜ij (n)|
is weighted by the empirical frequencies Tj/T (or even Tij/T ). For an action which is
only played because of exploration, this number converges to / (number of actions) (resp.
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(/ (number of actions))2 ), so even if we had |s¯ij (n)− s˜ij (n)| = 1, we could still bound
the required term by , which is needed in the proof of the respective theorem.
6.3 Empirical convergence rate of SM-MCTS(-A) algorithms
In this section, we investigate the empirical convergence rates of the analyzed algorithms.
We first compare the speeds of convergence of SM-MCTS-A and SM-MCTS and then in-
vestigate the dependence of the error of the eventual solution of the algorithms on relevant
parameters. Finally, we focus on the effect of removing the exploration samples discussed
in Section 4.
6.3.1 SM-MCTS with and without averaging
Figure 10 presents the dependence of the exploitability of the strategies produced by the
algorithms on the number of executed iterations. We removed the samples caused by
exploration from the strategy, as suggested in Section 4. All iterations are executed from
the root of the game. The colors (and line types) in the graphs represent different settings
of the exploration parameter. SM-MCTS-A (circles) seems to always converge to the same
distance from the equilibrium as SM-MCTS (triangles), regardless of the used selection
function. The convergence of the variant with averaging is generally slower. The difference
is most visible in the Anti game with Exp3 selection function, where the averaging can
cause the convergence to require even 10 times more iterations to reach the same distance
from NE as the algorithm without averaging. The situation is similar also in Oshi-Zumo.
However, the effect is much weaker with RM selection. With the exception of the Anti
game, the variants with and without averaging converge at almost the same speed.
In Section 3, we show that the finite time convergence rate that we were able to prove
is not very good. These experiments show that in our practical problems of smaller size,
suitable selection of the exploration parameter allows the algorithms to converge to its
eventual solution within 106 iterations. This indicates that the bound can be substantially
improved.
6.3.2 Distance from the equilibrium
Even though the depth of most games in Figure 10 was 5, even with large exploration (0.4),
the algorithm was often able to find the exact equilibrium. This indicates that in practical
problems, even the linear bound on the distance from the equilibrium from the example in
Section 7 is too pessimistic.
If the game contains pure Nash equilibria, as in Anti and the used setting of Oshi-Zumo,
exact equilibrium can often be found. If (non-uniform) mixed equilibria are required, the
distance of the eventual solution from the equilibrium increases both with the depth of the
game as well as the amount of exploration. The effect of the amount of exploration is visible
in Figure 10c, where the largest exploration prevented the algorithm from converging to the
exact equilibrium. More gradual effect is visible in Figures 10(g,h), where the distance
form the equilibrium seems to increase linearly with increasing exploration. Note that in
all cases, the exploitability (computed as the sum of exploitability of both players) was less
than 2 · M , where  is the amount of exploration an and M is the maximum utility value.
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(c) Goofspiel(5), Exp3
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(e) Oshi-Zumo(5), Exp3
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(g) Random(3,3), Exp3
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(h) Random(3,3), RM
Figure 10: Comparison of empirical convergence rates of SM-MCTS (triangles) and SM-
MCTS-A (circles) with Exp3 and RM selection functions in various domains.
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Figure 11: Convergence of SM-MCTS with Exp3 selection on random games with three
actions of each player in each stage and various depths.
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Figure 12: The effect of removing exploration samples in SM-MCTS with Exp3 selection
and  = 0.2.
Figure 11 presents the average distance from the equilibrium with SM-MCTS, Exp3
selection and exploration  = 0.2 in random games with B = 3 and various depths. The
eventual error increases with increasing depth, but even with depth of 6, the eventual error
was on average around 0.25 and always less than 0.3.
6.3.3 Removing exploration
In Section 4, we show that the computed strategy cannot, in general, get worse when we
disregard the samples caused by exploration. Figure 12 shows that in practice, the strategy
is usually improved from the very beginning of the convergence and the exploration should
always be removed.
7. Conclusion
Monte Carlo Tree Search has recently become a popular algorithm for creating artificial
game-playing agents. Besides perfect information games, where the behavior of the algo-
rithm is reasonably well understood, variants of the algorithm has been successful also in
more complex imperfect-information games. However, there was very little pre-existing
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SM-MCTS-A SM-MCTS
Assumptions -HC -HC, -UPO -HC only
Upper bound 2D(D + 1)
(
12(2D − 1)− 8D)  might not converge
Lower bound 2D 2D to approx. NE at all
Table 2: Summary of the proven bounds on the worst case eventual exploitability of the
strategy produced by SM-MCTS(-A) run with an -Hannan consistent selection function
theory that would describe the behavior of the algorithms in these games and provide
guarantees on their performance.
In this paper, we provide the theory and guaranteed results for the simplest, but still
important, subclass of imperfect information games – sequential zero-sum games with si-
multaneous moves, but otherwise perfect information. These games already include one of
the major complications caused by imperfect information, which is the need to use random-
ized strategies to guarantee the optimal performance. We also note that while we focus on
games with simultaneous moves, all presented theoretic results (apart from the SM-MCTS
counterexample from Section 5.2) trivially apply also to perfect information games with
sequential moves.
Our main results from Section 3 show that a variant of Monte Carlo Tree Search algo-
rithm, which we call SM-MCTS-A, in combination with any Hannan consistent algorithm is
guaranteed to eventually converge to Nash equilibrium of the game. Moreover, if the used
selection function, in addition to being HC, has the Unbiased Payoff Observations property,
even the standard SM-MCTS algorithm is guaranteed to converge to an approximate Nash
equilibrium. On the other hand, in Section 5 we present a counterexample showing that
there exist HC algorithms, which converge with SM-MCTS-A, but not with SM-MCTS.
More detailed results are summarized in Table 2. In Theorem 8 (15) we show that
SM-MCTS-A (SM-MCTS) algorithm with -HC selection function eventually converges at
least to C-NE of a game, where for game depth D, C is of the order D2 (2D). In Section 5,
we show that the worst case dependence of C on D cannot be sublinear, even after the
exploration is removed. This gives us both lower and upper bounds on the value of C, but
it remains to determine whether these bounds are tight. We form a hypothesis that the
tight bound is a linear dependence C = 3D (C = 2D after the exploration is removed).
In Section 4, we provide an analysis of previously suggested improvement of SM-MCTS
algorithm, which proposes the removal of samples caused by exploration from the played
strategy. We prove both formally and empirically that this modification of the algorithm is
sound and generally improves the strategy.
In Theorem 14 we show that, for a fixed confidence level, SM-MCTS-A algorithm con-
verges to the given C-equilibrium at rate at least 1/T
2
D2 . This estimate is most likely
overly pessimistic, as suggested by the empirical results.
Finally, we provide empirical investigation of the algorithms that shows that in practical
problems, the convergence times as well as the eventual distance from the Nash equilibrium
is better than the theoretic guarantees. We show that SM-MCTS-A converges slower than
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SM-MCTS with the commonly used HC selection functions, but they converge to the same
distance from the equilibrium. Moreover, the difference in convergence speed is smaller with
regret matching than with Exp3 and in many domains, it is negligible.
While this paper provides a significant step towards understanding of MCTS in simulta-
neous move games, it also leaves some problems open. First of all, many of the guarantees
presented in the paper have not been shown to be tight so an obvious future research direc-
tion would be to improve the guarantees or show the tightness of these results. Also, better
characterization of the requirements (on the selection function) which guarantee conver-
gence with SM-MCTS algorithm could be provided. For example, it would be interesting to
formally prove that the common Hannan consistent algorithms guarantee unbiased payoff
observations or a similar property that is sufficient to guarantee convergence of SM-MCTS
in this setting.
Furthermore, MCTS algorithms are generally used with incremental building of the
search tree and a problem-specific heuristic simulation strategy outside of the portion of
the search tree in memory. It would be interesting to analyze the behavior of the algorithms
with respect to basic statistical properties of the simulation strategy, such as its bias and
variance. Lastly, our analysis of simultaneous move games can be used as a basis for
analyzing MCTS as it is used in more general classes of imperfect information games.
References
Peter Auer, Nicolo Cesa-Bianchi, Yoav Freund, and Robert E Schapire. Gambling in a
rigged casino: The adversarial multi-armed bandit problem. In Proceedings of 36th Annual
Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science, pages 322–331. IEEE, 1995.
Peter Auer, Nicolo Cesa-Bianchi, and Paul Fischer. Finite-time analysis of the multiarmed
bandit problem. Machine learning, 47(2-3):235–256, 2002.
Peter Auer, Nicolo´ Cesa-Bianchi, Yoav Freund, and Robert E. Schapire. The nonstochastic
multiarmed bandit problem. SIAM J. Comput., 32(1):48–77, 2003.
A. Blum and Y. Mansour. Learning, regret minimization, and equilibria. In Algorithmic
Game Theory, chapter 4. Cambridge University Press, 2007.
Branislav Bosˇansky´, Viliam Lisy´, Jiˇr´ı Cˇerma´k, Roman Vı´tek, and Michal Peˇchoucˇek. Us-
ing Double-oracle Method and Serialized Alpha-Beta Search for Pruning in Simultaneous
Move Games. In Proceedings of the Twenty-Third international joint conference on Ar-
tificial Intelligence (IJCAI), pages 48–54. AAAI Press, 2013.
Cameron B Browne, Edward Powley, Daniel Whitehouse, Simon M Lucas, Peter I Cowling,
Philipp Rohlfshagen, Stephen Tavener, Diego Perez, Spyridon Samothrakis, and Simon
Colton. A survey of monte carlo tree search methods. IEEE Transactions on Computa-
tional Intelligence and AI in Games, 4(1):1–43, 2012.
Se´bastien Bubeck and Nicolo Cesa-Bianchi. Regret analysis of stochastic and nonstochastic
multi-armed bandit problems. Machine Learning, 5(1):1–122, 2012.
33
Kovarˇ´ık and Lisy´
Michael Buro. Solving the oshi-zumo game. In H.Jaap Van Den Herik, Hiroyuki Iida,
and ErnstA. Heinz, editors, Advances in Computer Games, volume 135 of IFIP — The
International Federation for Information Processing, pages 361–366. Springer US, 2004.
ISBN 978-1-4757-4424-8. doi: 10.1007/978-0-387-35706-5\ 23.
Nicolo Cesa-Bianchi and Gabor Lugosi. Prediction, Learning, and Games. Cambridge
University Press, New York, NY, USA, 2006. ISBN 978-0521841085.
Paolo Ciancarini and Gian Piero Favini. Monte Carlo tree search in Kriegspiel. Artificial
Intelligence, 174:670–684, July 2010.
Pierre-Arnuad Coquelin and Remi Munos. Bandit algorithms for tree search. In Pro-
ceedings of the Twenty-Third Conference Annual Conference on Uncertainty in Artificial
Intelligence (UAI-07), pages 67–74. AUAI Press, 2007.
Hilmar Finnsson and Yngvi Bjo¨rnsson. Simulation-based approach to general game playing.
In Proceedings of the 23rd National Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI), pages
259–264. AAAI Press, 2008.
Abraham D Flaxman, Adam Tauman Kalai, and H Brendan McMahan. Online convex
optimization in the bandit setting: gradient descent without a gradient. In Proceedings
of the sixteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms, pages 385–394.
Society for Industrial and Applied Mathematics, 2005.
Sylvain Gelly and David Silver. Monte-carlo tree search and rapid action value estimation
in computer go. Artificial Intelligence, 175(11):1856–1875, 2011.
Sergiu Hart and Andreu Mas-Colell. A simple adaptive procedure leading to correlated
equilibrium. Econometrica, 68(5):1127–1150, 2000.
Sergiu Hart and Andreu Mas-Colell. A reinforcement procedure leading to correlated equi-
librium. In Ge´rard Debreu, Wilhelm Neuefeind, and Walter Trockel, editors, Economics
Essays, pages 181–200. Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2001. ISBN 978-3-642-07539-1. doi:
10.1007/978-3-662-04623-4\ 12.
Michael Johanson, Kevin Waugh, Michael Bowling, and Martin Zinkevich. Accelerating
best response calculation in large extensive games. In Proceedings of the Twenty-Second
International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI), pages 258–265. AAAI
Press, 2011.
Thomas Keller and Patrick Eyerich. Prost: Probabilistic planning based on uct. In Proceed-
ings of the Twenty-Second International Conference on Automated Planning and Schedul-
ing (ICAPS), pages 119–127, 2012.
Levente Kocsis and Csaba Szepesva´ri. Bandit based monte-carlo planning. In Johannes
Frnkranz, Tobias Scheffer, and Myra Spiliopoulou, editors, Machine Learning: ECML
2006, volume 4212 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 282–293. Springer Berlin
Heidelberg, 2006. ISBN 978-3-540-45375-8.
34
HC selection for MCTS in Simultaneous Move Games
Daphne Koller and Nimrod Megiddo. The complexity of two-person zero-sum games in
extensive form. Games and Economic Behavior, 4:528–552, 1992.
Marc Lanctot, Viliam Lisy´, and Mark HM Winands. Monte Carlo tree search in simulta-
neous move games with applications to Goofspiel. In Proceeding of the IJCAI Computer
Games Workshop, volume 408 of Communications in Computer and Information Science
(CCIS), pages 28–43. Springer, 2014.
Viliam Lisy´, Branislav Bosˇansky´, and Michal Peˇchoucˇek. Anytime algorithms for multi-
agent visibility-based pursuit-evasion games. In Proceedings of the 11th International
Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems-Volume 3, pages 1301–1302.
International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, 2012a.
Viliam Lisy´, Radek P´ıbil, Jan Stiborek, Branislav Bosˇansky´, and Michal Peˇchoucˇek. Game-
theoretic approach to adversarial plan recognition. In 20th European Conference on
Artificial Intelligence (ECAI), pages 546–551. IOS Press, 2012b.
Viliam Lisy´, Vojta Kovarˇ´ık, Marc Lanctot, and Branislav Bosˇansky´. Convergence of monte
carlo tree search in simultaneous move games. In C.J.C. Burges, L. Bottou, M. Welling,
Z. Ghahramani, and K.Q. Weinberger, editors, Advances in Neural Information Process-
ing Systems 26, pages 2112–2120. Curran Associates, Inc., 2013.
Pim Nijssen and Mark HM Winands. Monte carlo tree search for the hide-and-seek game
scotland yard. IEEE Transactions on Computational Intelligence and AI in Games, 4(4):
282–294, 2012.
Sandeep Pandey, Deepayan Chakrabarti, and Deepak Agarwal. Multi-armed bandit prob-
lems with dependent arms. In Proceedings of the 24th International Conference on Ma-
chine Learning (ICML), pages 721–728, New York, NY, USA, 2007. ACM.
Pierre Perick, David L. St-Pierre, Francis Maes, and Damien Ernst. Comparison of different
selection strategies in monte-carlo tree search for the game of Tron. In Proceedings of
the IEEE Conference on Computational Intelligence and Games (CIG), pages 242–249,
2012.
Marc Ponsen, Steven de Jong, and Marc Lanctot. Computing approximate Nash equilibria
and robust best-responses using sampling. Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research, 42:
575–605, 2011.
Edward J Powley, Peter I Cowling, and Daniel Whitehouse. Information capture and reuse
strategies in monte carlo tree search, with applications to games of hidden information.
Artificial Intelligence, 217:92–116, 2014.
Glenn C. Rhoads and Laurent Bartholdi. Computer solution to the game of pure strategy.
Games, 3(4):150–156, 2012.
Sheldon M Ross. Goofspiel — the game of pure strategy. Journal of Applied Probability, 8
(3):621–625, 1971.
35
Kovarˇ´ık and Lisy´
Abdallah Saffidine, Hilmar Finnsson, and Michael Buro. Alpha-beta pruning for games with
simultaneous moves. In Proceedings of the Twenty-Sixth AAAI Conference on Artificial
Intelligence (AAAI), pages 22–26, 2012.
Mohammad Shafiei, Nathan Sturtevant, and Jonathan Schaeffer. Comparing UCT versus
CFR in simultaneous games. In Proceeding of the IJCAI Workshop on General Game-
Playing (GIGA), pages 75–82, 2009.
Gilles Stoltz. Incomplete information and internal regret in prediction of individual se-
quences. PhD thesis, Department of Mathematics, University Paris XI, ORSAY, 2005.
Olivier Teytaud and Se´bastien Flory. Upper confidence trees with short term partial infor-
mation. In Applications of Evolutionary Computation, volume 6624 of Lecture Notes in
Computer Science, pages 153–162. Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2011.
Kevin Waugh. Abstraction in large extensive games. Master’s thesis, University of Alberta,
2009.
Martin Zinkevich, Michael Johanson, Michael Bowling, and Carmelo Piccione. Regret min-
imization in games with incomplete information. In Advances in neural information
processing systems, pages 1729–1736, 2007.
Appendix A. Proofs
In this section we present the proofs for those results, which have not been already proven
in the main text. We start with the proof of Lemma 3, which states that eventually, there
is no difference between empirical and average strategies.
Proof [Proof of Lemma 3] It is enough to show that lim sup
t→∞
|σˆ1(t, i) − σ¯1(t, i)| = 0 holds
almost surely for any given i. Using the definitions of σˆ1(t, i) and σ¯1(t, i), we get
σˆ1(t, i)− σ¯1(t, i) = 1
t
(
ti −
t∑
s=1
σ1(s, i)
)
=
1
t
t∑
s=1
(
δi,i(s) − σ1(s, i)
)
,
where δi,j is the Kronecker delta. Using the (martingale version of) Central Limit The-
orem on the sequence of random variables Xt =
∑t
s=1
(
δi,i(s) − σ1(s, i)
)
gives the result
(the conditions clearly hold, since E
[
δi,i(t) − σ1(t, i)|X1, ..., Xt−1
]
= 0 implies that Xt is a
martingale and δi,i(t)− σ1(t, i) ∈ [−1, 1] guarantees that all required moments are finite).
Next, we prove Lemma 7 - which states that -Hannan consistency is not substantially
affected by additional exploration.
Proof [Proof of Lemma 7] Denoting by * the variables corresponding to the algorithm A∗
we get
r∗(t) =
1
t
R∗(t) ≤ 1
t
(1 · tex +R(t− tex))
=
tex
t
+
R(t− tex)
t− tex ·
t− tex
t
,
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where, for given t ∈ N, tex denotes the number of times A∗ explored up to t-th iteration. By
Strong Law of Large Numbers we have that lim
t→∞
tex
t = γ holds almost surely. This implies
lim sup
t→∞
r∗ (t) ≤ lim sup
t→∞
tex
t
+ lim sup
t−tex→∞
R (t− tex)
t− tex · lim supt→∞
t− tex
t
≤ γ +  (1− γ)
≤ γ + ,
which means that A∗ is (+ γ)-Hannan consistent. The guaranteed exploration property
of A∗ is trivial.
A.1 Proofs related to the convergence of SM-MCTS-A
In this section we give the proofs for lemmas which were used to prove Theorem 8. We
begin with Lemma 9, which established a connection between average payoff g and game
value v for matrix games.
Proof [Proof of Lemma 9] It is our goal to draw conclusion about the quality of the empirical
strategy based on information about the performance of our -HC algorithm. Ideally, we
would like to somehow relate the utility u(σ) to the average payoff g(t). However, as this
is generally impossible, we can do the next best thing:
u (br, σˆ2(t)) = max
i
∑
j
σˆ2(t, j)aij = max
i
∑
j
tj
t
aij =
1
t
max
i
∑
j
tjaij
=
1
t
max
i
t∑
s=1
aij(s) =
1
t
Gmax(t) = gmax(t). (11)
Step 1: Let η > 0. Using -HC property gives us the existence of such t0 that gmax(t) −
g(t) < + η2 holds for all t ≥ t0, which is equivalent to g(t) > gmax−(+ η2 ). However, in our
zero-sum matrix game setting, gmax is always at least v, which implies that g(t) > v−(+ η2 ).
Using the same argument for player 2 gives us that g(t) < v+ + η2 . Therefore we have the
following statement, which proves the inequalities (3):
∀t ≥ t0 : v − (+ η
2
) < g(t) < v + +
η
2
holds almost surely.
Step 2: We assume, for contradiction with inequalities (4), that with non-zero proba-
bility, there exists an increasing sequence of time steps tn ↗ ∞, such that u (br, σˆ2(tn)) ≥
v + 2+ η for some η > 0. Combing this with the inequalities, which we proved above, we
see that
lim sup
t→∞
r (t) ≥ lim sup
n→∞
r (tn) = lim sup
n→∞
(gmax (tn)− g (tn))
= lim sup
n→∞
(u (br, σˆ2 (tn))− g (tn))
≥ v + 2+ η − (v + + η/2) = + η > 
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holds with non-zero probability, which is in contradiction with -Hannan consistency.
Remark 33 In the following proof, and in the proof of Proposition 19, we will be working
with regrets, average payoffs and other quantities related to matrix games with error, in
which we have two sets of rewards - the rewards aij corresponding to the matrix M and
the “observed” rewards aij(t). We will denote the variables related to the distorted rewards
aij(t) by normal symbols (for example gmax(t) = maxi
1
t
∑t
s=1 aij(s)(s) and use symbols with
tilde for the variables related to the rewards aij (for example g˜max(t) = maxi
1
t
∑t
s=1 aij(s)).
Proof [Proof of Proposition 11] This proposition strengthens the result of Lemma 9 and its
proof will also be similar. The only additional technical ingredient is the following inequality
(12):
Since M(t) is a repeated game with error c, there almost surely exists t0, such that for
all t ≥ t0, |aij(t)− aij | ≤ c holds. This leads to
|gmax(t)− g˜max(t)| ≤ max
i
∣∣∣∣∣1t
t∑
s=1
(
aij(s)(s)− aij(s)
)∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ t0t + c · t− t0t t→∞−→ c. (12)
The remainder of the proof contains no new ideas, and it is nearly exactly the same as the
proof of Lemma 9, therefore we just note what the two main steps are:
Step 1: Hannan consistency gives us that
∀η > 0 ∃t0 ∈ N ∀t ≥ t0 : g (t) ≥ v − (+ η)− |gmax (t)− g˜max (t)| holds a.s.,
from which we deduce the inequalities
v − (+ c) ≤ lim inf
t→∞ g(t) ≤ lim supt→∞ g(t) ≤ v + + c.
Step 2: For contradiction we assume that there exists an increasing sequence of time steps
tn ↗∞, such that
u(br, σˆ2(tn)) ≥ v + 2(c+ 1)+ η (13)
holds for some η > 0. Using the identity g˜max (tn) = u (br, σˆ2(tn)) and inequalities (12) and
(13), we then compute that the regret r(tn) is too high, which completes the proof:
 ≥ lim sup
t→∞
r (t) ≥ lim sup
n→∞
r (tn) = lim sup
n→∞
(gmax (tn)− g (tn))
(11)
≥ lim sup
n→∞
(u (br, σˆ2(tn))− |g˜max(tn)− gmax(tn)|)− lim sup
n→∞
g(tn)
(12),(13)
≥ (v + 2(c+ 1)+ η)− c− (v + + c)
= + η > .
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A.2 Proofs related to the convergence of SM-MCTS
In Section 3.2 we gave the proof of convergence of those SM-MCTS algorithms, which were
based on -UPO selection functions. It remains to prove Proposition 19, which establishes
a connection between regrets R and R˜ of the selection function with respect to the observed
rewards and with respect to the exact subgame values. The goal is to show that if R(T ) is
small and algorithm A is -UPO, then the regret R˜(T ) is small as well.
Proof [Proof of Proposition 19] Let A be a -HC algorithm with -UPO property. Recall
here Remark 33 - by R˜ (T ) we denote the regret of action sequence i(t) chosen by A against
the adversary’s action sequence j(t) in the matrix game (vij) - that is
R˜ (T ) = max
i∗
T∑
t=1
vi∗j(t) −
T∑
t=1
vi(t)j(t) =: max
i∗
S˜i∗(T ),
and by R (T ) we denote the “observed” regret
R (T ) = max
i∗
T∑
t=1
si∗j(t)
(
ti∗j(t)
)− T∑
t=1
si(t)j(t)
(
ti(t)j(t)
)
=: max
i∗
Si∗(T ).
To prove the proposition it is sufficient to assume that lim supT R (T ) /T ≤  and show that
lim supT R˜ (T ) /T ≤ 2 (c+ 1)  holds almost surely. Let i∗ be an action of player 1. Denote
by a) the fact that, by definition of wij (n), Tj =
∑Ti∗j
m=1wi∗j (m) holds for each T and j,
and by b) the equivalence si∗j(t)(ti∗j(t)) = si∗j(m) ⇐⇒ (j(t) = j & ti∗j(t) = m). We can
rewrite Si∗ (T ) as follows:
Si∗ (T ) =
T∑
t=1
si∗j(t)
(
ti∗j(t)
)− T∑
t=1
si(t)j(t)
(
ti(t)j(t)
)
b)
=
∑
j
Ti∗j∑
m=1
si∗j (m)
∣∣{t ≤ T | ti∗j(t) = m& j(t) = j}∣∣−∑
i,j
Tij∑
m=1
sij (m)
a)
=
∑
j
Tj∑Ti∗j
m=1wi∗j (m)
Ti∗j∑
m=1
si∗j (m)wij (m)−
∑
i,j
Tij
Tij
Tij∑
m=1
sij (m)
=
∑
j
Tj s˜i∗j (Ti∗j)−
∑
i,j
Tij s¯ij (Tij)
=
∑
j
Tj (vi∗j + s˜i∗j (Ti∗j)− vi∗j)−
∑
i,j
Tij (vij + s¯ij (Tij)− vij)
=:
∑
j
Tj∑
m=1
vi∗j −
∑
i,j
Tij∑
m=1
vij +Xi∗ (T )
=
T∑
t=1
vi∗j(t) −
T∑
t=1
vi(t)j(t) +Xi∗ (T ) ,
= S˜i∗ (T ) +Xi∗ (T )
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where
Xi∗ (T ) :=
∑
j
Tj (s˜i∗j (Ti∗j)− vi∗j)−
∑
i,j
Tij (s¯ij (Tij)− vij) .
In particular, we can bind the regret R(T ) as
R˜(T ) = max
i∗
S˜i∗(T ) = max
i∗
(Si∗(T )−Xi∗(T )) ≤ R(T ) + max
i∗
|Xi∗(T )| .
Clearly Xi∗ (T ) satisfies∣∣∣∣Xi∗ (T )T
∣∣∣∣ ≤ ∑
j
Tj
T
|s˜i∗j (Ti∗j)− vi∗j |+
∑
i,j
Tij
T
|s¯ij (Tij)− vij | .
Using the -UPO property and the assumption that lim supn |s¯ij (n)− vij | ≤ c holds a.s.
for each i, j, we get
lim sup
T→∞
∣∣∣∣Xi∗ (T )T
∣∣∣∣ ≤ lim sup
T→∞
∑
j
Tj
T
|s˜i∗j (Ti∗j)− vi∗j |+
+
∑
i,j
Tij
T
|s¯ij (Tij)− vij |
≤ (c+ 1)  lim sup
T→∞
∑
j
Tj
T
+
+c lim sup
T→∞
∑
i,j
Tij
T
= (2c+ 1) .
Consequently, this implies that
lim sup
T→∞
R˜ (T ) /T ≤ lim sup
T→∞
R (T ) /T + lim sup
T→∞
max
i∗
Xi∗ (T ) /T
≤ + (2c+ 1)  = 2 (c+ 1) 
holds almost surely, which is what we wanted to prove.
A.3 Details related to the counterexample for Theorem 15
In Section 5.2 (Lemma 30) we postulated the existence of algorithms, which behave similarly
to those from Example 3, but unlike those from Example 3, the new algorithms are -HC.
First, we define these algorithms and then we prove their properties in Lemma 36. Lemma
30, which was needed in Section 5.2, follows directly from Lemma 36.
Remark 34 In the following description of algorithm AJ1 , ch denotes how many times the
other player cheated, while c¯h is the average ratio of cheating in following the cooperation
pattern. The variables c˜h and ˜¯ch then serve as the estimates of ch and c¯h. We present the
precise definitions below. The nodes I, J, actions X, Y, L, R, U and D and the respective
payoffs refer to the game G from Figure 6.
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Definition of the algorithm AJ1 :
Fix an increasing sequence of integers bn and repeat for n ∈ N:
1. Buffer building Bn: Play according to some -HC algorithm for bn iterations (con-
tinuing with where we left of in the (n− 1)-th buffer building phase).
2. Cooperation Cn: Repeat U,U,D,D for t = 1, 2, ... and expect the other player to
repeat L,R,R,L. At each iteration t, with probability , check whether the other
player is cooperating - that is play D instead of U resp. U instead of D, and if
the payoff does not correspond to the expected pattern the second player should be
following, set c˜h (t) = 1 . If the other player passes this check, or if we did not perform
it, set c˜h (t) = 0.
3. End of cooperation (might not happen): While executing step 2, denote ˜¯ch (t) :=
1
t
∑t
s=1 c˜h (s). Once t satisfies
 · bn
bn + t
+
1 · t
bn + t
≥ 2,
we check at each iteration whether the estimate ˜¯ch (t) threatens to exceed 2 during
the next iteration or not. If it does, we end the cooperation phase, set n := n+ 1 and
continue by the next buffer building phase.
4. Simulation of the other player: While repeating steps 1, 2 and 3, we simulate
the other player’s algorithm AJ2 (this is possible, since from the knowledge of our
action and the received payoff, we can recover the adversary’s action). If it ends the
cooperation phase and starts the next buffer building phase, we do the same.
5. Unless the cooperation phase is terminated, we stay in phase Cn indefinitely.
Definition of AJ2 : The algorithm A
J
2 is identical to A
J
1 , except for the fact that it repeats
the pattern U, D, D, U instead of L, R, R, L and expects the other player to repeat L, R,
R, L.
Definition of AI : The algorithm AI is a straightforward modification of AJ1 , with 2 in
place of  - it repeats the sequence Y, X, X, Y and expects to receive payoffs 0, 0, 0, ...
whenever playing X and payoffs 1, 0, 1, 0, ... when playing Y . However, whenever it
deviates from the Y, X, X, Y pattern in order to check whether these expectations are met,
it plays the same action once again (in order to avoid disturbing the payoff pattern for Y ).
Remark 35 The steps 2 and 3 from the algorithm description are correctly defined, because
the opponent’s action choice can be recovered from the knowledge of our action choice and
the resulting payoff. Regarding step 3, we note that the condition here is trivially satisfied
for t = 1, ..., bn, so the length tn of the cooperation phases Cn tends to infinity as n→∞,
regardless of the opponent’s actions.
Lemma 36 (1) When facing each other, the average strategies of algorithms AI , AJ1 and
AJ2 will converge to the suboptimal strategy σ
I = σJ1 = σ
I
2 =
(
1
2 ,
1
2
)
. However the algorithms
will suffer regret no higher than C for some C > 0 (where C is independent of ).
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(2) There exists a sequence bn (controlling the length of phases Bn), such that when fac-
ing a different adversary, the algorithms suffer regret at most C. Consequently AI , AJ1 and A
J
2
are C-Hannan consistent.
Proof Part (1): Note that, disregarding the checks made by the algorithms, the average
strategies in cooperation phases converge to
(
1
2 ,
1
2
)
. Furthermore, the probability of making
the checks is the same at any iteration, therefore if the algorithms eventually settle in
cooperative phase, the average strategies converge to
(
1
2 ,
1
2
)
.
Step (i): The conclusion of (2) holds for AJi , i = 1, 2.
We claim that both algorithms AJi , i = 1, 2 will eventually settle in the cooperative
mode, thus generating the payoff sequence 1, 0, 1, 0 during at least (1− )2-fraction of the
iterations and generating something else at the remaining 1− (1− )2 < 2 iterations. It is
then immediate that the algorithms AJi suffer regret at most 2 (since σ
J is 2-equilibrium
strategy).
Proof of (i): If the other player uses the same algorithm, we have E
[
c˜h (t)
]
=  and
Var
[
c˜h (t)
]
≤ 1 <∞, thus by the Strong Law of Large Numbers ˜¯ch (t)→  almost surely.
In particular, there exists t0 ∈ N such that
Pr
[
∀t ≥ t0 : ˜¯ch (t) ≤ 2
]
> 0.
In Remark 35 we observed that the cooperative phase always lasts at least bn steps. There-
fore once we have bn ≥ 1 t0, there is non-zero probability both players will stay in n-th co-
operative phase forever. If they do not, they have the same positive probability of staying
in the next cooperative phase and so on - by Borel-Cantelli lemma, they will almost surely
stay in Cn0 for some n0 ∈ N.
Step (ii): AI will eventually settle in the cooperative mode.
Proof of (ii): This statement can be proven by a similar argument as (i). The only
difference is that instead of checking whether the other player is cheating, we check whether
the payoff sequence is the one expected by AI . The fact that AI settles in cooperative mode
then immediately implies that AI will repeat the Y, X, X, Y pattern during approximately
(1− 4)-fraction of the iterations (we check with probability 2 and we always check twice).
It is then also immediate that AI will receive the expected payoffs during at least (1− )-
fraction of the iterations (the payoff is always 0, as expected, when X is played and it
is correct in at least 1 − 2 cases when playing Y . X and Y are both played with same
frequency, which gives the result.).
Step (iii) : If AJi , i = 1, 2 and A
I settle in cooperative mode, then AI suffers regret
at most C.
Proof of (iii): We denote by a (t) the t-th action chosen by AI and by (a∗(s)) the 4-periodic
of sequence of actions starting with Y, X, X, Y. Moreover we denote by sY (n) the n-th
payoff generated by AJ1 and A
J
2 and by xY (t) the number sY (tY ). Set also xX (t) = 0 for
each t ∈ N. Finally we denote by (x∗B(s)) the 4-periodic of sequence of payoffs starting with
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1, 0, 0, 0. Our goal is to show that the average regret
r (t) =
1
t
(
t∑
s=1
xY (s)−
t∑
s=1
xa(s) (s)
)
=
is small. As we already observed in Example 3, if neither the payoff pattern 1, 0, 1, 0, ...
from node J , nor the action pattern Y, X, X, Y, ... at node I are disturbed, then we have
(a(s)) = (a∗(s)) and (xY (s)) = (x∗Y (s)), and therefore A
I suffers no regret. Consequently,
we have
r (t) =
1
t
|{1, ..., t} \ {s ≤ t| a(s) = a∗(s) & xY (s) = x∗Y (s)}|
≤ 1
t
|{s ≤ t| a(s) 6= a∗(s)} ∪ {s ≤ t| xY (s) 6= x∗Y (s)}| . (14)
Firstly recall that when AI deviates from its action pattern, it does so twice in a row.
Since the sequence sY is 2-periodic, any disturbance of a (t) and a (t+ 1) might change the
payoffs xY (t) , xY (t+ 1) but it will affect none other. By (ii) this change of action a (t)
concerns at most a 4-fraction of the iterations and so we have
lim
t→∞
1
t
|{s ≤ t| a(s) 6= a∗(s)}| ≤ 4. (15)
Secondly when sY (n) deviates from the expected pattern, this affects those iterations t
for which tY = n. This will typically be 2 iterations, unless A
I was doing its checks - those
are done with probability 2, therefore with probability 2, 4 iterations are affected, with
probability (2)2, 6 iterations are affected and so on... Since we are interested in the limit
behavior, we can assume that at average no more than
∑∞
k=0 2 · (2)k < 4 iterations are
affected by each disturbance to sY (assuming, of course, that  <
1
4). By (i) we know that
no more than 2-fraction of numbers sY (s) will be changed. Consequently no more than
4 · 2-fraction of payoffs xY (s) will be changed and we have
lim
t→∞
1
t
|{s ≤ t| xY (s) 6= x∗Y (s)}| ≤ 8. (16)
Putting these two information together, we see that
lim sup
t→∞
r (t)
(14)
≤ lim sup
t→∞
1
t
|{s ≤ t| a(s) 6= a∗(s)}|+
+ lim sup
t→∞
1
t
|{s ≤ t| xY (s) 6= x∗Y (s)}|
(15), (16)
≤ 4+ 8 = 12,
which is what we wanted to prove.
Part (2): Algorithms AJi , i = 1, 2 are C-HC.
a) Firstly, we assume that both players stick to their assigned patterns during at least
(1− 2)-fraction of iterations (in other words, assume that lim sup c¯h (t) ≤ 2). By the
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same argument as in (1), we can show that the algorithms will then suffer regret at most
C.
b) On the other hand, if lim sup c¯h (t) > 2, the algorithm will almost surely keep switching
between Bn and Cn (consequence of Strong Law of Large Numbers). Denote by rb,n and
rc,n the regret from phases Bn and Cn, recall that bn, tn are the lengths of these phases
and set
rn :=
bn
bn + tn
rb,n +
tn
bn + tn
rc,n = overall regret in Bn and Cn together.
Finally, let r = lim sup r (t) denote the bound on the limit of regret of AJi . We need to
prove that r ≤ C. To do this, it is sufficient to show that lim supn rn is small - thus our
goal will be to prove that if the sequence bn increases quickly enough, then lim sup rn ≤ C
holds almost surely. Denote by (Fn) the formula
∀t ≥ 1

bn :
˜¯ch (t) ≤ 2 =⇒ c¯h (t) ≤ 3.
We know that
∣∣∣ ˜¯ch− c¯h∣∣∣→ 0 a.s., therefore we can choose bn such that
Pr [(Fn) holds] ≥ 1− 2−n
holds. Since
∑
2−n <∞, Borel-Cantelli lemma gives that (Fn) will hold for all but finitely
many n ∈ N. Note that if (Fn) holds for both players, then their empirical strategy is at
most 3 away from the NE strategy, and thus rc,n ≤ C. Since rn is a convex combination
of rb,n and rc,n and in Bn we play -consistently, we can compute
r ≤ lim sup rn ≤ max {lim sup rb,n, lim sup rc,n} ≤ max {, C} = C.
The proof of C-Hannan consistency of AI is analogous.
A.4 Proofs related to the finite time bound for SM-MCTS-A
In order to get a bound on finite time behavior of SM-MCTS-A, we need the following finite
time analogy of Proposition 11:
Lemma 37 Let  > 0, c > 0, δ > 0 be real numbers and let (aij(t)) be a repeated game with
error c played by -Hannan consistent players (using the same algorithm A). Denote by t1
the time needed for algorithm A to have average regret r(t) bounded by  for every t ≥ t1
with probability at least 1− δ, by t2 the time such that |aij(t)− aij | < c for every t ≥ t2.
Set t0 = max
{
t1, 
−1t2
}
. Then with probability at least 1− 2δ for each t ≥ t0 we have
v − (c+ 2)  ≤ g (t) ≤ v + (c+ 2) 
and no player can gain more than 2 (c+ 2)  utility by deviating from strategy σˆ (t) in the
matrix game M .
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Remark 38 The proof is a simple modification of Proposition 11. The difference between
this lemma and Proposition 11 is the introduction of δ and t0. The important part of the
claim is the value of the constant t0.
Proof As in equation (12) of the mentioned proof, we get for t ≥ t2
|gmax(t)− g˜max(t)| ≤ max
i
∣∣∣∣∣1t
t∑
s=1
(
aij(s) − aij(s)(s)
)∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ 1 · t2t + c · t− t2t .
If we now take t ≥ t0, we have t ≥ −1t2, and thus
|gmax(t)− g˜max(t)| ≤ t2
−1t2
+ c · t
t
= (c+ 1).
Next step is the same as in the previous proof, except that we replace c by (c+ 1). This
leads to the following analogy of the inequality (3), which holds with probability at least
1− 2δ:
∀t ≥ t1 : v − (c+ 2)  ≤ g (t) ≤ v + (c+ 2) .
Remainder of the proof also proceeds as before, thus we only present the main steps: Assume
that
u (br, σˆ2 (t)) ≥ v + 2 (c+ 2) + η (17)
holds for some t ≥ t0 ≥ t1 and η > 0. We get the inequality
gmax (t) ≥ v + (c+ 2) + + η,
which we combine with inequality
g(t) ≤ v + (c+ 2)
in order to get
r (t) = gmax (t)− g (t) ≥ [v + (c+ 2) + + η]− [v + (c+ 2)] = + η > . (18)
Since both players are -HC and t ≥ t1, we know that the inequality (18) (or its analogy
for the second player) cannot hold with probability higher than 2δ, and thus neither can
the inequality (17) (or its analogy for the second player). This concludes the proof.
In the proof of Theorem 14, we will need to guarantee that each of nodes in depth d of
game tree gets visited at least T -times with high probability, for some T ∈ N. Because of
this, we include the following technical notation, and related Lemma 40. Firstly, we present
the notation and the corresponding lemma, then we proceed to give the necessary details.
Notation 39 Let δ, γ > 0 and b ∈ N. For integers T and d, we denote by t(T, d) the
smallest number, such that if algorithm with exploration rate γ is used in a game with
branching factor b for t(T, d) iterations, then with probability at least 1 − δ, each of the
nodes in depth d will be visited at least T -times.
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Lemma 40 Let δ, γ > 0 and b ∈ N and assume that T ∈ N satisfies T ≥ 4 log δ−1 +4 log 2.
Then we have
t(T, d) ≤ 16
(
1
γ
)d−1
log 2bd−1 · bd−1T.
Remark 41 Consider a game with branching factor b and depth D and an algorithm A
which explores with probability γ > 0. For the purposes of this section, we will say that the
root is in depth d = 1, there are at most b nodes in depth d = 2, bd−1 nodes in depth d,
d ≤ D and the whole game tree H has got at most |H| = 1+b+ ...bD−1 nodes. For simplicity
we assume that the game tree is already built. At each iteration, there is probability γd−1
that the algorithm A will explore on every level of the game tree between the root and d-th
level. This means that with probability γd−1 one of the nodes on d-th level will be chosen
with respect to the uniform distribution over all of these bd−1 nodes.
Let n, t ∈ N. We denote by U(n) the uniform distribution over the set {1, ..., n}, let
Xs
iid∼ U (n) for s = 1, ..., t be independent random variables with the same distribution as
U (n) and set mU(n, t) = min
1≤i≤n
∑t
s=1 I (Xs = i). Moreover, let S ∈ N and consider S inde-
pendent random choices whether to explore with probability γd−1 (or else play accordingly
to some other strategy with probability 1− γd−1). Out of these S iterations, we will choose
to explore S˜ many times. Using this notation, the number t(T, d) satisfies
t(T, d) = min
{
S ∈ N| Pr[mU(bd−1, S˜) ≥ T ] ≥ 1− δ.
}
.
Proof [Proof of Lemma 40] Denote T˜ = 8 log (2n)nT . Firstly we show that Pr[mU(n, T˜ ) ≥
T ] ≥ 1− δ/2, then we follow with the inequality Pr
[
S˜ ≥ 12γd−1S
]
≥ 1− δ/2. Putting these
two inequalities together with n = bd−1, S = 2
(
1
γ
)d−1
T˜ gives the result.
Step 1: For the first part, we find u ∈ N, such that p = Pr[mU(n, u) ≥ 1] ≥ 12 . Using
elementary combinatorics we get that 1− p = Pr[mU(n, u) = 0] ≤ 1− n · (n−1n )u, and thus
p ≥ 1
2
⇐⇒ n ·
(
n− 1
n
)u
≥ 1
2
⇐⇒ exp
(
u log
n− 1
n
)
≥ 1
2n
⇐⇒ u log n− 1
n
≥ log 1
2n
⇐⇒ u ≥ log 2n · log
(
1 +
1
n− 1
)
⇐= u ≥ log 2n · 11
2 · 1n−1
⇐= u ≥ 2n log 2n.
Dividing T˜ into 4T blocks of length 2n log 2n gives us 4T independent “trials” with
success probability at least 12 , where success increases of mU by at least one in given block.
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This means that Pr[mU(n, T˜ ) ≥ T ] ≥ Pr[B(4T, 12) ≥ T ], where B(·, ·) denotes binomial
distribution. Chernoff bound for binomial distribution gives us
Pr[B(4T,
1
2
) ≥ T ] ≥ 1− exp
(
− 1
2 · 12
(2T − T )2
4T
)
= 1− exp (−T/4) .
Therefore, the conclusion holds for integers T ∈ N satisfying exp (−T/4) ≤ δ/2, which is
equivalent to T ≥ 4 log δ−1 + 4 log 2.
Step 2: For the second part, we know that S˜ ∼ B(S, γd−1) is a binomially distributed
variable. Using Chernoff bound, we have (writing p = γd−1)
Pr[S˜ ≥ p
2
S] = 1−Pr
[
B(S, p) ≤ p
2
S
]
≥ 1− exp
(
− 1
2p
·
(
pS − p2S
)2
S
)
= 1− exp
(
−γ
d−1
8
S
)
.
Choosing S ≥ 2
(
1
γ
)d−1
T˜ , we get both p2S ≥ T˜ and
1− exp
(
−γ
d−1
8
S
)
≥ 1− exp
(
−T˜ /4
)
≥ 1− exp (−T/4) ≥ 1− δ/2.
We are now ready to give the following proof:
Proof [Proof of Theorem 14] Fix δ > 0 and let TA denote the time needed for A to have
average regret smaller than 2’ with probability at least 1− δ.
Set T1 = TA. For a fixed node h in depth D, we have by Lemma 37 that the inequalities
vh − 2 ≤ gh(t) ≤ vh + 2 (since dh = D, we can represent the situation at h as a repeated
game with error c = 0 and t2 = 0) hold for t ≥ T1 = max
{
T1, 
−1 · 0} with probability at
least 1− 2δ. However, we need these inequalities to hold for all bD−1 nodes in depth D at
once. To guarantee that we visit all of them at least T1 many times with probability at least
1 − 2δ, we need t ≥ T2, where T2 = t(−1T1, D). Taking product of all these probabilities,
we get that all of the mentioned conditions hold at the same time with probability at least
(1− 2δ)bD−1 (1− δ). We are done with D-th level of the game tree.
Assume that everything above holds. Note that surely T2 ≥ TA. By Lemma 37 (t0 =
max
{
TA, 
−1T2
}
= −1T2, c = 1) we know that if we visit a node h in depth D− 1 at least
−1T2 many times, the inequalities vh − 4 ≤ gh(t) ≤ vh + 4 will hold with probability at
least 1− 2δ. Again we find such a number T3 that will guarantee that we visit each of these
bD−2 nodes at least −1T2 many times with probability at least 1−δ (as in paragraph above
T3 = t(
−1T2, D − 2)). The probability of all conditions mentioned in this paragraph being
satisfied at once will be (1− 2δ)bD−2 (1− δ).
We continue by induction and receive numbers T4, T5, ..., TD, which satisfy Td+1 =
t(−1Td, d). We now calculate the exact numbers for probability, equilibrium distance and
time bounds:
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Taking product of probabilities (1− 2δ)bd−1 (1− δ) for d = 1, ..., D gives us
(1− 2δ)2(bD−1+...+b2+b+1) (1− δ)D = (1− 2δ)2|H| (1− δ)D ≥ 1− (2 |H|+D) δ.
On (D + 1− d)-th level of the tree, we have vh − (cd + 2)  ≤ gh(t) ≤ vh + (cd + 2) , where
cd = 2d− 2 (easily checked by induction, as cd+1 = cd + 2 and c1 = 0). Lemma 37 implies
that no player can gain more than 2 (cd + 2)  = 4d by changing his action on given level
only. Note that these possible deviations sum to
D∑
d=1
4d = 2D (D + 1) . (19)
Finally we calculate the value of TD by substituting from Lemma 40:
TD =TA ·
D∏
d=2
(
−1 · 16
(
1
γ
)d−1
log 2bd−1 · bd−1
)
=TA ·
(
16−1
)D−1( b
γ
)D−1
2
(D−1+1)
log
(
2b+ ...+ 2bD−1
)
=TA16
D−1−(D−1)
(
b
γ
)D
2
(D−1)
log (2 |H| − 2) .
With probability at least 1 − (2 |H|+D) δ we get (by (19)) that for every t ≥ TD no
player can gain more than 2D (D + 1)  utility by choosing a different action in any (or
all at once) node of the tree. Multiplying this result by two, we get that the empirical
frequencies will form 4D (D + 1) -equilibrium for every t ≥ TD with probability at least
1− (2 |H|+D) δ - the proof is finished.
Note that in the proof above, we assumed that SM-MCTS-A algorithm starts when the
game tree is already built. If we wanted to start with an empty game tree, we would have
to increase the time bound by additional constant, such that with high probability, we first
visit all b nodes one level below the root at least once, then we visit all b2 nodes in the next
level, and so on. By Lemma 40 this constant would be equal to t(1, 1) + ... + t(1, D), a
number which is negligible when compared to other parts of the finite time bound.
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